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The Argentinean economy has just ended another lost decade. After the peak registered in 2011, 
the per capita GDP has oscillated with a decreasing trend, leaving the economy poorer than it 
was ten years before. During these ten years, different governments with conflicting 
macroeconomic programs were in power, none of them able to save the economy from 
stagflation. The goal of this paper is to address to what extent the economic performance would 
have been better had other policy combinations been implemented. The analysis is made 
through an empirical quarterly stock-flow consistent (SFC) model for the period 2007–19 in 
order to ensure the coherence of the results and to give the outcomes of the simulations a 
holistic and dynamically consistent interpretation. From the results of the simulations it seems 
that the problem that is keeping Argentina in stagflation goes beyond the domain of 
macroeconomics. The fact that in practice two divergent macroeconomic programs were 
implemented—neither of them being able to produce good and sustainable macroeconomic 
performance—is a first symptom that favors the case for that hypothesis. When the model is 
used to counterfactually test the policy recommendations of these approaches with the external 
conditions that prevailed while the opposite program was implemented, none of them yield 
results that can be deemed sustainable. Yet, the model developed in this paper can be useful for 
studying the different policy combinations that, given a specific context, can bring about more 
stable and sustainable dynamics for the Argentinean economy.   
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The Argentinean economy has just ended another lost decade. After the peak registered in 2011, 
the per capita GDP has oscillated with a decreasing trend, the fluctuations being mostly driven 
by the dynamics of the exchange rate1 (figure 1). In parallel, the rate of inflation exhibited an 
accelerating trend that could only be contained when the nominal exchange rate was kept under 
control. The weak macroeconomic performance coincided with two antagonistic political 
regimes: while the second presidency of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2012–15) attempted to 
establish a “social Keynesian” wage-led regime of accumulation,2 the administration of 
Mauricio Macri (2016–19) intended to lay the foundations of a finance-dominated accumulation 
regime3 similar to the ones observed in the Pacific countries of the region, with Chile as the role 
model. From a theoretical standpoint it seems fair to associate the first model with Latin 
American structuralism and Post-Keynesian traditions—in the case of the second, the New 
Keynesian approach4 seems to fit rather well. From a political perspective, the detractors of the 
former refer to it as a variant of populism, while the critics of the latter label it as tout court 
neoliberalism. The confrontation of these two models was a symptom of a deeper ideological 
contest that Argentinean society had been carrying on since the 1940s, though undermined 
through different means between the mid-1970s and the late 2000s. When it came to the surface 
in 2008 after a four-month crisis between the government and the agribusiness sector, the 






1 The years 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2019 were periods where sharp devaluations took place, mostly as a  
result of the impossibility of sustaining the nominal exchange rate at the prevailing levels.  
2 Chena et al. (2018) label this way the attempt to deploy a set of policies that strengthened real disposable 
income—the main driver of private consumption—in a context where the wage bill could not grow any longer.    
3 The notion of a finance-dominated regime of accumulation was not proposed by the government, but is a 
characterization based on the similarities between the orientation of the policies that were actually implemented and 
the features of the finance-dominated regimen as defined by Hein and Van Treek (2010) and Hein (2012). Among 
the main features of this regime, they distinguish a worsening of income distribution, higher household 
indebtedness to finance consumption, increasing shareholder power in the investment decision, and the 
liberalization of capital markets.     
4 By the New Keynesian approach, we are referring to the theoretical framework underlying the inflation targeting 
regime. For a critical discussion about this framework, see Arestis and Sawyer (2008).  
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Figure 1. Per Capita GDP and Inflation 
 
Source: Own elaboration from the data published by National Institute of Statistics and Surveys (INDEC).  
 
From a Regulation Theory perspective, the failure of these two different macroeconomic models 
suggests that either they were internally inconsistent at the level of the institutions,5 thereby 
becoming unstable or, being institutionally consistent, they failed to achieve a coherent relation 
with the features of the underlying structure or with the external context of their time. The 
combination of these two possibilities is, however, the most likely explanation for the fact that 
in the beginning of the 2020s, Argentina is poorer than it was ten years before. With the 
advantage of hindsight, this paper examines to what extent the performance of the economy 
would have been better had other policy combinations (i.e., a different institutional 
arrangement) been implemented. The analysis is made through an empirical stock-flow 
consistent (SFC) model in order to ensure the coherence of the results and to give the outcomes 
of the simulations a holistic and dynamically consistent interpretation. The model is built on a 
quarterly basis for the period 2007–19 and used to address four questions, two of them 
regarding the 2012–15 period and the other two focused on the 2016–19 interval. In the four 
 
5 For the French Regulation Theory school, institutions are devices through which the conflicts that are inherent in 
any society are (temporarily) stabilized. Economic policy instruments such as the rate of interest, various tax rates, 
labor institutions, exchange rate, trade policy, capital controls, etc., are, from this perspective, tools through which 
specific goals can be pursued, but always keeping in mind that the they have a nonneutral effect on the founding 
conflict upon which any society is built.      
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cases the questions attempt to propose alternative policy combinations to the ones that were 
actually implemented. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, a brief description of Argentina’s 
recent macroeconomic history is presented. In section 3, there is a presentation of different 
interpretations to the facts described in section 2. These interpretations are useful to derive the 
research questions that are addressed by means of the model described in sections 4 and 5. In 
section 4 we define the matrices upon which the model is built; the data sources and the 
methodology for obtaining the “missing variables” are also presented. Section 5 specifies the 
system of difference equations that define the model conceptually designed in section 4. In 
section 6, the model is used to tackle the four research questions posed in section 3. Finally, the 
study’s main conclusions are presented. 
 
 
2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
In December 2001, Argentina suffered the worst economic crisis in its entire history.6 The 
currency board regime, which had successfully ended the hyperinflation of the late 1980s, was 
going through a slow death. The commercial openness of the economic regime combined with 
the real exchange rate appreciation led to a persistent current account deficit that could only be 
financed with external indebtedness. External finance became harder to find as other emergent 
economies were hit by the crises that followed the outbreak in South East Asia in 1997. The 
sustainability indicators of Argentina did not show a promising outlook either. After three years 
of recession and massive increases in the unemployment and poverty rates, the currency board 
exploded in January 2002. As a result of the regime switch, which came along with a change in 
the government,7 the external debt was defaulted on and the nominal exchange rate, although 
initially depreciated by 40 percent, ended up suffering a 280 percent devaluation in only six 
months. In 2002, GDP contracted by 10.9 percent. 
 
6 At the moment of writing this paper, the effects of the quarantine implemented in the context of the COVID-19 
pandemic seem to be even worse than those registered in 2001. 
7 President Fernando De La Rúa resigned after 39 persons were killed by the police in the riots that took place in 
Buenos Aires. After ten days where three different persons temporarily took up the presidency, Eduardo Duhalde 
was finally chosen by the legislature to finish De La Rúa’s mandate.  
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The abandonment of the currency board gave the economy much more breathing space. The 
combination of a floating and competitive real exchange rate with the relief that the default 
implied in terms of external debt servicing laid the foundations for a process of high growth 
rates. The Néstor Kirchner administration (2003–07) could deploy expansionary policies to 
restore the levels of consumption that prevailed before the long recession of the 1990s. Private 
employment recovered and the real wage was strengthened, thereby improving income 
distribution. A depreciating US dollar derived from the expansionary policies of the US Federal 
Reserve contributed to maintaining the real exchange rate at competitive levels despite the 
continuous increases in the real wage. Investment gradually increased as utilization levels 
approached the “normal” rates and expectations were optimistic, which was not surprising 
taking into account that the economy was growing at rates around 8 percent. From the financial 
balances of the three aggregate sectors of the economy (figure 2) it is observed that the economy 
was making up lost ground in a seemingly sustainable manner, since the high growth rates were 
being attained together with the “twin surpluses” (government and external), while the private 
sector was net saving. 
 
Figure 2. Financial Balances (as a percentage of GDP) 
 





These virtuous dynamics were suddenly interrupted by the global financial crisis (GFC). 
Although Argentina quickly recovered from the shock, the sustainability of the growth regime 
(as interpreted from the evolution of the financial balances) was put in jeopardy. The current 
account started to worsen continuously and hit a 2 percent deficit-to-GDP ratio in 2013. 
Although under normal conditions a deficit of this size should have not found difficulties in 
obtaining external financing sources, these were not available for Argentina, allegedly due to the 
government’s contentious approach to global financial markets and an unsolved conflict with 
“holdout” creditors.8 When the Macri administration took office it quickly solved these pending 
issues with the “vulture funds,” thereby gaining access to global financial markets. The result 
was not only a persistent current account deficit (now hidden by the easy access to external 
credit) but also an unsustainable process of external indebtedness. In any case, since the private 
sector’s financial balance tends to be rather constant all over the sample, the behavior of the 
current account is mirrored by the financial balance of the government, though with no 
necessary a priori order of causation. It seems clear, however, that following the GFC, either the 
configuration of Argentina’s regime of accumulation or the external context changed 
significantly, leading to an unsustainable path that would eventually end up in a lost decade.       
 
In order to gain some insight into the dynamics of the financial balances it is useful to portray 
some of their main determinants. From figure 3 it is possible to infer a high correlation between 
the energy trade balance and the current account deployed in figure 2. The worsening of the 
energy trade balance follows unsolved structural bottlenecks in the supply side, which 
eventually impose constraints to the economy’s rate of growth unless the scarcity of energy is 
compensated for with imports. This structural limitation, which can only be overcome with 
investment, was aggravated by a combination of exogenous forces. First, the main trading 
partner, Brazil, entered a stagnation that resulted in a process of high political uncertainty that 
(eventually) fed back into the economy. Second, the commodity supercycle ended, leaving 
export prices at half of their peak levels. Third, the real exchange rate started to appreciate as 
inflation accelerated from 2007 onwards, leading to increasing imports of goods and services 
until capital controls and nontariff barriers were imposed in 2012 (until 2015). The acceleration 
 
8 The conflict arose as a result of a group of the so-called “vulture funds,” who did not accept the debt restructuring 
proposed by Argentina in 2005 and decided to take the case to the courts in New York. In 2012, Judge Griesa found 
in favor of the creditors. For a brief timeline of the Argentina’s conflict with these hedge funds, see Moyer (2016).  
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of inflation, the determinants of which are estimated in the model presented in section 5, is of 
utmost importance since the policy combinations of the two periods of analysis (2012–15 and 
2016–19) are ultimately different attempts to solve the same problem: an increasing inflation 
rate (that went from 8.4 percent in 2007 to 53.8 percent in 2019) that was generating multiple 
disequilibria in the economy.       
 
Figure 3. Main Determinants of the Current Account (indices) 
 
Source: Own elaboration from the data published by INDEC, Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 
(IBGE), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
 
Unlike the current account, whose dynamics were mostly explained by structural or external 
factors, the changes observed in the government’s financial balance were naturally driven by 
policy decisions or, eventually, automatic reactions to shocks in other spheres of the economy 
(i.e., institutional devices that are still policy decisions, although not necessarily easily 
modifiable).9 Figure 4 exhibits the main components of the general government budget balance. 
The first conclusion that is drawn is that from 2004 to 2019, the government almost doubled its 
size (measured as the total expenditures divided by nominal GDP). Although all the components 
 
9 Some examples of these institutional devices that automatically adjust to changes in other parts of the economy 
are cash transfers to low-income households and informal workers, nominal pensions for retirees, and subsidies to 
energy production.    
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increased, the larger size of the public sector seems to be explained by a larger social security 
network10 and a policy oriented to regulate some of the economy’s key prices (mainly 
electricity, gas, and public transportation), which is captured under the “subsidies” account. 
From 2011, the increase in public employment (included in public consumption) was also 
important. The interest payments account started to contribute more significantly to public 
spending in 2016, when the process of indebtedness was initiated during the Macri 
administration. From figure 4 it is clear that although government revenue increased over the 
sample period, it did so more weakly than expenditures, thereby resulting in the negative 
financial balance portrayed in figure 2.           
 
Figure 4. Main Components of the Government Balance (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: Own elaboration from the data published by INDEC.  
 
Figure 2 shows that even though there were major changes in the financial balances of the 
public and external sectors over the period of analysis, the private sector balance tended to 
oscillate around a surplus of 2 percent of GDP with no major deviations (with the exception of 
the year of the GFC and 2019). As the SFC tradition points out, the fact that a sector is saving 
 
10 During the government of Néstor Kirchner (2003–7) and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007–15) there was a 
remarkable policy of enhanced rights, among which the full pension coverage and child allowance for informal 
workers stand out. 
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implies that it is accumulating wealth. The flow-of-funds matrix describes the form that this 
wealth accumulation takes. On the contrary, for those sectors with a negative financial balance 
(i.e., a deficit) the flow-of-funds shows by means of which liabilities the deficits are being 
financed. These stock-flow relations are important because the form under which a certain 
sector accumulates its wealth or finances its deficits is not neutral. Of special importance are the 
currency denomination, maturity, and liquidity of these assets.  
 
In order to analyze the private sector’s balance sheet,11 which is illustrated in figure 5, it should 
be borne in mind that when inflation started to accelerate, the Fernández de Kirchner 
government, not sympathetic to the inflation targeting framework, did not take the mainstream 
proposition of increasing the interest rate. This progressively translated into a negative real 
interest rate that made domestic financial assets less attractive. In order to prevent this from 
translating into a strong demand for foreign assets, strict limitations to the acquisition of foreign 
exchange were imposed. It should also be noted that once the Macri administration took office 
these controls were removed, and the central bank switched to a regime of positive real interest 
rates. Given the high inflation rates during those years (while inflation was standing at 25 
percent in 2015 before Macri took office, in 2016 inflation reached 44 percent) even the high 
nominal interest rates established by Argentina’s central bank were insufficient for achieving a 
positive real interest rate target. 
 
From the analysis in figure 5 the following features stand out. First, fixed capital is by far the 
largest component of the balance sheet. Second, capital seems to have increased its share in the 
balance sheet until 2014. Thenceforth, it lost ground against foreign assets, government debt, 
and central bank bills, a rather expected behavior in a financialized institutional setting. Third, 
taking the financial component of the balance sheet, foreign assets are the dominant form of 
wealth accumulation. This signals one of Argentina’s historical structural weaknesses: the lack 
of a secure and sound instrument for preserving wealth. Fourth, after a reduction in the stock of 
government debt and central bank bills held by the private sector, they started to increase from 
2015 onwards. The evolution of the composition of the balance sheet seems to be tied to the 
government’s approach to the problem of inflation and to the type of regulation on the domestic 
 
11 Since Argentina has no official flow-of-funds matrix, the model presented in this paper attempts to construct a 
simplified version of this statistical instrument appealing to different data sources. For further details, see section 4. 
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financial market: the share of fixed capital tends to increase while there are controls on the 
acquisition of foreign exchange and real interest rates are negative, while the share of foreign 
assets tends to increase whenever it is possible to acquire them, and the purchase of domestic 
bonds and bills seems to be related to the their real rates of return.   
 
Figure 5. Main Components of the Private Sector’s Assets (as a percentage of total assets) 
 
Source: Own elaboration from the data published by INDEC.  
 
From all these facts it is important to draw two important conclusions. First, if the private sector 
tends to run surpluses and the dominant form of accumulating financial wealth is the acquisition 
of foreign assets, private surpluses can be destabilizing because they can lead to present or 
future tensions in the balance of payments. The tensions will be contemporaneous if the demand 
for foreign exchange cannot be met by a trade surplus of capital inflows; the tensions will be 
transferred to the future if the current demand for foreign exchange is successfully met with an 
increase in indebtedness. Second, if the attempt to prevent the private sector from demanding 
foreign exchange entails the issuance of short-term assets with high interest rates (as the central 
bank bills issued in the period 2016–19), this can lead to a snowball effect of cumulative interest 
payments that are capitalized under the form of the acquisition of new assets. Once these short-
term assets reach maturity they have to be rolled over, creating an unsustainable spiral that 
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ultimately puts the balance of payments under pressure through the channel of the acquisition 
foreign assets.  
 
Thus, to achieve financial and macroeconomic stability it is necessary to provide the private 
sector with wealth accumulation forms that do not put the balance of payments in jeopardy. The 
importance of the increasing inflation rate in the whole period of analysis and the different 
attempts to reduce it is strongly related to the private sector’s portfolio decisions—as long as 
there is no medium-term asset denominated in domestic currency that is deemed capable of 
delivering a positive return (in real terms and, taking into account the Argentinean mindset, in 
dollars as well) it will be hard for any growth regime, right-wing or left-wing, to attain 
macroeconomic sustainability.    
 
The preceding description of Argentina’s macroeconomic performance can be summarized in 
the six-dimensional diagram portrayed in figure 6. The first dimension is the external flows 
fragility, which measures the capacity of the economy to meet its demand for foreign 
exchange.12 The higher the economy is placed in this dimension, the higher the excess demand 
for foreign exchange. The second dimension is the external debt (as a percentage of GDP). The 
higher (lower) the external debt, the more (less) room there is available for financing a balance 
of payments deficit through the issuance of more debt. The third dimension is the firepower of 
the central bank to counter a run against the domestic currency.13 It should be borne in mind that 
the firepower is inversely plotted in the diagram: the higher we move along the axis, the lower 
the firepower of the central bank (because it represents a higher ratio of short-term debt to 
foreign reserves). From the presentation of the first three dimensions it is deduced that the 
economy is safer the closer it is to the bottom-left-front vertex of the box. The more it departs 
from that point and, more specifically, the closer it gets to the top-right-back vertex, the higher 





12 The index of external flows fragility is given by the ratio of the sum of imports, interest payments, and net 
acquisition of foreign exchange (total demand for foreign exchange) to exports (supply of foreign exchange).  
13 The firepower index is given by the ratio of short-term liquid debt (mostly money, deposits, and central bank 
bills) to the foreign reserves held by the central bank.   
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Figure 6. External Vulnerability 
 
Source: Own elaboration.  
 
The fourth dimension of the diagram is given by the size of the economy, approximated through 
per capita GDP and represented by the size of the dot. The fifth dimension simply represents the 
years where the economy suffered a crisis, defined as a situation where either the nominal 
exchange rate suffered a discontinuous devaluation or the central bank had to impose strong 
capital outflow controls to prevent those devaluations from triggering. The sixth dimension is 
time.    
 
In 2004, the Argentinean economy was relatively small in size and was hugely indebted 
(although in a situation of default). However, this constraint did not prevent it from recovering 
from the 1999–2002 crisis because it had a foreign exchange surplus (very low position in the 
external flows fragility plane), which resulted in an increase in the central bank’s firepower 
(very low position in the firepower plane). Between 2005 and 2006, the external debt was 
sharply reduced thanks to a restructuring process and the early cancellation of the debt with the 
IMF. As the economy grew all the way to the year 2008, the foreign exchange surplus started to 
vanish, mainly driven by the acquisition of foreign assets by the private sector. This could have 
been taken as a first warning message. The GFC temporarily interrupted this seemingly 
unsustainable behavior, which was restored when the economy recovered in 2010 and 2011. 
Strikingly, the economy suffered a balance of payments crisis in 2012, having a low current 
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account deficit, very low levels of external indebtedness, and a relatively high level of central 
bank firepower. Regardless of the low levels of indebtedness, the government chose not to 
appeal to external financing. With this policy decision in mind and knowing that the central 
bank’s firepower was finite, the leakage of foreign exchange was stopped by establishing tight 
capital controls. 
 
Although from 2012 to 2015 capital controls were effective at reducing (almost to zero) the 
demand for foreign assets, the foreign exchange deficit increased due to the current account 
deficit.14 At the same time, the firepower of the central bank was diminishing because in order 
to keep the parallel market of foreign exchange (a usual outcome when tight controls are 
established) still required some sales of foreign reserves. The government’s agreements with 
other central banks to provide some foreign exchange15 (reflected in the slight increase in the 
external debt) were not sufficient to rescue the economy from the crisis. They were enough, 
instead, to maintain an institutional setting that left the economy with a historically high level of 
income, although in a clearly unsustainable position on the external front.  
 
The story during the Macri administration was similar to the ones previously observed in other 
experiences of governments with the same political orientation, both in Argentina and Latin 
America: the government undertook a massive liberalization of the economy that resulted in a 
very fast increase in foreign indebtedness. This coincided with the worsening of the current 
account (also driven by the liberalization of trade flows) and a huge increase in the acquisition 
of foreign assets by the private sector (this is observed in the jump along the external flows 
fragility plane in figure 6). In order to attract foreign financial capital and to undermine the leak 
of foreign exchange, the central bank increased the issuance of short-term bills paying high 
interest rates. The dream world would only last two years. In 2018, global financial markets 
interpreted that Argentina’s model was not sustainable and ceased lending to the country. The 
 
14 The effectiveness of capital controls at reducing the acquisition of foreign assets should not be interpreted as a 
successful policy, since the byproduct was a growing gap between the official and parallel exchange rates and a 
series of incentives misalignments. For instance, exporters were encouraged to underinvoice their transactions to 
avoid liquidating the proceeds of their exports at the official (low) rate. Importers, for their part, were encouraged 
to overinvoice their purchases to acquire foreign exchange at the official rate (cheaper compared to the parallel 
rate). 
15 For instance, in 2014, the central bank agreed with the People’s Bank of China on a currency swap equivalent to 
11 billion US dollars.  
14 
 
central bank had to start liquidating its firepower, which was insufficient to prevent two 
devaluations in a matter of months. A major collapse could only be prevented by appealing to 
the IMF, which gave Argentina the largest bail-out in its entire history (57 billion USD). In a 
little more than a year, however, the IMF also convinced itself about the unsustainability of 
Argentina’s trajectory and decided not to disburse the last installment of the stand-by 
agreement. Devoid of any form of financing, suffering a continuous leak of foreign exchange, 
and with almost no more central bank firepower, Macri lost the elections and left power, 
defaulting on the internal debt and reestablishing the capital controls whose removal had made 
up its main campaign slogan.            
 
When Alberto Fernández took office on December 10, 2019, the economy was the size it was in 
2007 but with an inflation rate of 53 percent, a balance of payments crisis, a massive external 
debt with a maturity asymmetrically concentrated in the next few years, and almost no foreign 
reserves at the central bank. Moreover, the Obama times of international cooperation and the 
commodity boom were over. The COVID-19 pandemic was just breaking out. Another lost 
decade had been written in Argentina’s history.         
 
 
3. THE MACROECONOMIC DECLINE OF ARGENTINA: ALTERNATIVE 
INTERPRETATIONS 
 
In this section we present alternative interpretations of Argentina’s macroeconomic performance 
during the 2010s. These contending visions are used to pose the research questions that will be 
addressed through the model developed in the next two sections. 
 
From the description of Argentina’s main variables, it is clear that after the recovery from the 
GFC the economy took an unsustainable growth path. From a Regulation Theory perspective, 
Chena et al. (2018,18) describe this period as an “externally constrained social Keynesianism,” 
namely, a regime where: i) the main growth engine was private consumption16 but, instead of 
 
16 According to Chena et al. (2018, 7) the whole period governed by the Kirchners was driven by private 
consumption (wage-led growth) because it is not possible for an economy with an underdeveloped capital goods 
production sector to be driven by investment (profit-led growth). Moreover, they argue that if the production 
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being driven by growth in employment it was pushed by the increase in public social spending 
and; ii) a series of difficulties, both internal and external, whose result was a scarcity of foreign 
exchange that eventually put an upper limit to the rate of growth of GDP. 
 
Until 2011 the main explanatory variable of the growth in private consumption was the increase 
in the real wage bill, which was in turn driven by the growth in private employment and the 
increase in the real wage. These dynamics seem to have reached a limit at this point, beyond 
which they could no longer be sustained. Not being able to switch to a regime of accumulation 
where the economy was sustainably pushed by investment (given its high negative impact on 
the trade balance) or exports (given the composition of the export basket), the government had 
no choice but to take the central position in the hierarchy of institutionalized forms. In practice, 
this implied the implementation of an income redistribution policy based on the strengthening of 
the social security network and the regulation of some of the key prices in the economy, mainly 
utilities. By keeping inflation lower than in a context of no price regulation it was possible to 
protect the real wage (in order to keep consumption driving aggregate demand) and to avoid a 
further real exchange rate appreciation, which would have ended up putting even more pressure 
on the nominal exchange rate and, therefore, on the whole viability of the process. 
 
Another key element that Chena et al. (2018, 35) identify in characterizing the 2011–15 period 
as a regime of accumulation where finance was subordinated to the wage-labor nexus and the 
State adopted a leading place is the establishment of a null or even negative real interest rate. 
This policy was oriented to bolster consumption and to promote investment in productive rather 
financial capital. But in practice the result was the fueling of the mounting pressures on the 
exchange rate, which came from the deterioration of the trade balance and the political tensions 
that arose from a series of conflicts between the government and the private sector, both local 
and foreign. Simultaneously, the wage-price spiral persisted, as neither unions nor firms gave in. 
At the end of the day, the persistence of inflation made it even harder to cope with the external 
constraint in a context where the government opted for a fine-tuning policy rather than a 
traditional adjustment through a contractionary devaluation among the lines described by Díaz-
 
structure is not sufficiently diversified it is unlikely that net exports can make up a growth engine (export-led 
growth). The competitive real exchange rate registered in the 2000s has to be seen as a condition of possibility but 
not as the main growth driver.  
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Alejandro (1963) and Krugman and Taylor (1978). The fine-tuning policy implied, in the 
external dimension, the establishment of quantitative restrictions on the acquisition of foreign 
exchange and import quotas. That is how the externally constrained social Keynesianism model 
was closed, keeping aggregate demand and employment at historically high levels but with 
growing tensions on the macro-financial front.   
 
The regulation mode adopted in the 2011–15 period had, broadly speaking, two types of 
critiques coming from two different theoretical strands. On one side, there was the critique from 
the representatives of the mainstream who, with the New Keynesian model in mind, argued that 
there was a problem of fiscal dominance and an underestimation of the effects of inflation, 
which was also being tackled mistakenly. A reference to the New Keynesian critique to the 
structuralist Post-Keynesian model that was in place until 2015 can be found in Sturzenegger 
(2019)17when he describes not only the model that was in mind of the government that would 
take power in December 2015 (note that the title of his paper is “Macri’s Macro”) but also the 
initial conditions on which it had to be based. On the other side, there was the critique from the 
new developmentalism strand, mainly focused on the need to establish a real exchange rate that 
allowed the technically efficient sectors to compete in global markets. A representation of this 
view can be found in Rapetti (2013) and Gerchunoff and Rapetti (2016), who argue that the 
increases in the real wage were possible until the GFC because the US dollar was depreciating 
worldwide, but when conditions changed in the aftermath it would have been wiser to allow the 
nominal exchange rate to depreciate or to borrow from abroad instead of establishing import 
quotas and capital outflow controls. 
 
From a New Keynesian perspective, expansionary fiscal policies take output beyond its natural 
level, thereby inducing upward pressures on the rate of inflation. An inflation targeting 
framework, provided that aggregate demand is sensitive enough to the changes in the interest 
rate, should take output back to its natural level, thereby eliminating inflationary pressures. The 
 
17 The reference to Sturzenegger is not a minor detail, since he was not only one President Macri’s most important 
advisors but also the governor of the Central Bank of Argentina from December 2015 until June 2018. During his 
mandate he attempted to establish an inflation-targeting monetary policy framework, along the lines proposed in the 
New Keynesian model. After failing at reducing inflation (Sturzenegger himself explains the mistakes that his 
administration and the Treasury made in the process), the inflation targeting framework was abandoned in 
September 2018.   
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strong commitment of the monetary authority to pursue the inflation target should also align 
(forward-looking) inflation expectations around the target. From Sturzenegger’s narrative about 
the planning of the adjustment program in case Macri won the 2015 elections it seems clear that 
reducing the fiscal deficit was the main goal. Taking into account political criteria, the decision 
was to make the fiscal adjustment gradually, which implied taking debt on global markets 
(Sturzenegger 2019, 6). The fiscal adjustment would be combined with the removal of the 
quantitative restrictions on the acquisition of foreign exchange (for both commercial and 
financial motives) and with the establishment of a floating exchange rate. In the description of 
the vision of Macri’s economic cabinet that Sturzenegger expresses, it is possible to find the 
main critiques to the structuralist Post-Keynesian model undertaken by the Kirchners.18  
 
For its part, the New Developmentalist model proposed by Gerchunoff and Rapetti (2016) 
acknowledges that inflation had an important conflicting claims component. Based on 
theoretical contributions that combine elements of the Latin American structuralism,19 Post-
Keynesianism,20 and neoclassical economics,21 they build a system for the real exchange rate 
(which is a function of the wage and the nominal exchange rate, in the case of the former 
because it is part of the price equations of nontradable goods, in the case of the latter because it 
is one of the key determinants of the price of tradable goods) and an exogenous policy variable 
that is positively related to the level of absorption (changes in this policy variable increase 
absorption). They derive a single equilibrium that they call the “macroeconomic equilibrium 
real exchange rate,” which is the level of the exchange rate such that given the exogenous policy 
variable of the model the economy meets both the internal and external equilibrium. The 
internal equilibrium is given by all the combinations of the real exchange rate and policy 
variables that yield full employment. The external equilibrium is the one that meets the balance 
 
18 “The team also argued that it would be easier to build credibility by using a framework that was mainstream, in 
line with the idea of the normalization of Argentina. This was basically also the reason why the use of incomes 
policies were discarded, though other arguments were that the government did not want to sit ‘the old-politics’ 
players at the decision table and that utility price adjustments would take a long time. Additionally, income policies 
would seem similar to some of the policies implemented by the previous administration with which the current 
administration wanted to provide a clean distinction” (Sturzenegger 2019, 11). 
19 Mainly the description of a multisector economy, each of them bearing specific features regarding production 
techniques, input requirements, and productivity.   
20 For instance, there is an explicit reference to Rowthorn (1977), which is at the core of the Post-Keynesian theory 
of inflation. 
21 They assume that the tradable good is produced using a Cobb-Douglass production function, which implies that 
the demand for labor automatically adjusts to changes in the wage. 
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of payments equilibrium, defined as a situation where the current account balance can be 
financed by a “normal” or “long-term” financial inflow. Additionally, they define an ad hoc 
equilibrium, which they call the “social equilibrium real exchange rate,” which is the one that 
not only yields full employment but also the income distribution desired by workers. The key 
conclusion of their analysis, which is applied to the period 1930–2015, is that as a result of the 
historical processes that resulted in the strengthening of labor institutions and taking into 
account Argentina’s production structure, the social equilibrium tends to imply a lower (more 
appreciated) real exchange rate than the macroeconomic equilibrium, thereby leading to what 
they call a “structural distributive conflict” (Gerchunoff and Rapetti 2016, 228). 
 
From the New Developmentalist point of view, the period before the GFC was rather 
extraordinary because the international depreciation of the US dollar allowed Argentina to 
simultaneously attain an increasing real wage and real exchange rate, at the time that high 
commodity prices made the external constraint nonbinding. However, in the aftermath of the 
crisis, Argentina was situated in the internal equilibrium (private employment was historically 
high), probably close to the social equilibrium (the real wage had been increasing for several 
years), but had departed from the external equilibrium (the real exchange rate had appreciated as 
the US dollar started to rise and inflation accelerated in Argentina). According to the New 
Developmentalist model, the restoration of the macroeconomic equilibrium required both a 
devaluation and a less-expansionary fiscal policy.22 Such a movement would have implied, 
however, a departure from the close-to-the-social-equilibrium position in which the economy 
stood around 2010–11.  
 
To sum up, there are two main alternative paths that, according to these theoretical approaches, 
the economy could have taken after the GFC. First, a radical change in the approach to the 
problem of inflation, which could have consisted of a fiscal tightening, a more restrictive 
 
22 Dvoskin, Feldman, and Ianni (2020) show that the relationship between the real exchange rate depreciation and 
the increase in employment that the restoration of the macroeconomic equilibrium would have required relies on 
the assumption that the production function of the tradable good follows a perfect substitutes form and on the fact 
that the internationally competing tradable good is a manufactured good whose labor intensity is higher than the 
one of an alternative primary tradable good. Also, when the contractionary effect of the devaluation is considered, 
the model requires that the excess production of the tradable good is automatically absorbed by exports. If these 
assumptions do not hold, the channels that New Developmentalism identifies for establishing a positive relationship 
between competitive exchange rates and economic growth no longer hold.     
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monetary policy, and/or a fully floating exchange rate—alternatively, the pursuit of a stable real 
exchange rate at competitive levels with a less expansionary fiscal policy. What the two 
proposals share is the rejection of the quantitative controls on the acquisition of foreign 
exchange for both commercial and financial transactions. Thus, from these two critiques, we 
derive two research questions to be addressed by means of the model presented in the next 
section.     
 
The plan implemented during the Macri administration intended, as Sturzenegger (2019) 
explains, to conduct macroeconomic policy following a more mainstream approach. The main 
pillars of the plan were: i) removal of the capital controls and establishment of a floating 
exchange rate regime; ii) gradual reduction of the fiscal deficit, mainly through the removal of 
the subsidies on utilities; iii) establishment of a tight monetary policy that would converge to an 
inflation targeting framework with no other anchor than the central bank’s credibility; and iv) 
regularization of Argentina’s conflict with the holdouts, which was keeping the country unable 
to obtain funding in the global markets. As the capital controls were progressively removed23 
there was a surge in capital inflows, which benefited from spectacular profits (the nominal 
interest rate was above 30 percent and the nominal exchange rate was stable, thanks to the 
massive inflows). The result of these inflows, particularly those arising from the rise in the 
public external debt, was an increase in foreign reserves. The monetary expansion derived from 
this process had to be sterilized, implying a rise in central bank short-term liabilities whose 
maturity, according to Sturzenegger, they tried to lengthen by increasing the longer rates with 
relative success. Although the central bank considered that monetary policy was successful as 
core inflation was declining, the regular increases in the prices of utilities (as the government 
was reducing the subsidies in order to converge to a balanced budget) forced it to keep up with 
the monetary tightening.   
 
The internal critiques to the plan as implemented can be taken from Sturzenegger’s analysis. 
Sturzenegger argues that the central bank misread the market signals more than once, even 
during his own administration, when the absorption of an important part of the monetary base at 
 
23 In January 2017, the Treasury decided to lift the only requirement that was left, which obliged foreign financial 
capital to stay in the country for at least four months. The removal of this requirement implied that foreign capital 
could enter and leave the country in a matter of hours.  
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decreasing (but high, of the order of 35 percent) interest rates was taken as an increase in the 
market’s credibility on the monetary policy framework. In hindsight, he argues that monetary 
policy should have been tighter even when it seemed to be delivering satisfactory results 
(Sturzenegger 2019, 10). Moreover, Sturzenegger (2019, 18) recognizes the tensions inside the 
economic cabinet when he stresses that the tight monetary policy was resisted by the Treasury, 
which advocated for a looser approach to boost the economy, to the extent that he concludes that 
“the government showed significant procrastination in the fiscal front, even through 2018” 
(Sturzenegger 2019, 25). Also, he claims that the partial success of the disinflation policy was 
putting pressure on the fiscal accounts because half of the public spending was backward 
indexed: “Hence, the Treasury started pushing for increasing inflation targets to ensure a slower 
disinflation path. As 2017 came to an end, the Finance Minister started doubting whether it 
would be able to finance abroad the stubborn deficit and started demanding that the Central 
Bank shorten its maturities in the local peso market” (Sturzenegger 2019, 29). The battle was 
won by the Treasury: in December 2017, the government—the central bank included—
announced the change in the inflation target: “The President had decided to fire the Governor if 
needed to go ahead. So the Central Bank was confronted with an Executive that had decided to 
lower rates, increase the inflation targets 5 p.p. (from 10 to 15 percent), and shorten the maturity 
of Central Bank liabilities (basically 1–5 months)” (Sturzenegger 2019, 29). From 
Sturzenegger’s point of view this decision was a hard blow to the market’s credibility on the 
strongest pillar of the economic plan: the monetary policy framework. Four months later the 
government was finding itself unable to get financing from global markets, which marked the 
beginning of the end of the Macri administration. The third question that will be addressed 
through the model is, thus, the hypothetical effects that the inflation targeting regime could have 
had in the absence of fiscal dominance.  
 
Besides Sturzenegger’s remarks on the policies adopted by his own government, there are other 
critiques that were made to the macroeconomic program. We select two of them: i) the 
appropriateness of an inflation targeting framework to tackle the dynamics of prices and 
whether the initial conditions for such a regime were met; and ii) the massive increase in the 
external debt. Regarding the monetary policy framework, it is argued that the inflation theory 
embedded in the New Keynesian model did not account for Argentina’s main drivers of 
inflation, mainly the movements in the exchange rate and the price of utilities (which in the 
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model are taken as an exogenous shock with zero mean), many of which are important inputs of 
other goods and services. The empirical evidence for Argentina suggests that supply-side factors 
tend to be more relevant in the explanation of the dynamics of prices than demand pressures 
(Zack, Montané, and Kulfas 2018). Moreover, as Libman (2018) explains, the historical 
evidence shows that inflation targets were used more to keep price dynamics low than to 
stabilize a high rate of inflation and that they tend to work when a specific set of initial 
conditions are met (which was not the case in Argentina). From these assessments it is 
interesting to examine in hindsight what could have been the effects of a less ambitious inflation 
targeting framework. Such a program would have not taken supply-side factors as exogenous 
shocks but rather as key determinants of prices, which should have been treated in a more 
careful manner, probably at the cost of reducing the speed of convergence toward a balanced 
budget. This is the fourth question that will be addressed by means of the model. 
 
The second critique to the plan implemented by the Macri administration concerns the massive 
increase in external indebtedness and its relationship with capital outflows. As has been 
documented by different authors (Brenta 2019; Manzanelli, González, and Basualdo 2017), 
capital flight has been a constant phenomenon in the recent decades, adhering to a series of 
factors among which one can identify the pattern of productive specialization, the share of 
natural resources in income, the high degrees of concentration of foreign capital in the 
ownership of nonfinancial corporations, the subsequent macroeconomic crises and inflation, and 
the absence of a sufficiently developed capital market. However, capital outflows tend to 
increase when restrictions are lifted and, in particular, in times of surges in the external debt. 
Using the balance of payments residual method, Rua and Zeolla (2018) conclude that an 
important part of capital outflows was financed by means of newly acquired external debt, 
which in turn was mostly denominated in foreign currency. The misuse of a valid tool like 
foreign financing ends up putting more pressure on the original problem: the external constraint. 
Even if this constraint can be removed temporarily (while foreign capital keeps on flowing 
inwards), the result is the accumulation of obligations in foreign exchange that eventually 
become impossible to pay. In other words, the processes of external indebtedness makes the 
economy move from a speculative to a Ponzi position, which lasts as long as the creditors are 
willing to keep the music going. Thus, a fifth question that can be addressed through the model 
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is whether Macri’s macro could have been more stable if the degree of foreign indebtedness 
would have been smaller.24 
 
The alternative interpretations to Argentina’s macroeconomic performance in the 2010s and the 
two economic models that were implemented provide us with four questions that, together, can 
shed some light on two more general but, at the same time, fundamental questions: Could any of 
the governments that ruled Argentina during these years have found a more sustainable policy 
framework? And, if not, is it possible to find the solutions to Argentina’s persistent instability in 
the domain of macroeconomics? In the next section we proceed to the construction of the 
analytical device through which the questions posed in this section will be addressed.          
 
 
4. ARGENTINA’S ECONOMY IN THE LIGHT OF SFC MODELS 
 
In this section we lay the foundations for the construction of the empirical SFC model for 
Argentina. After a brief revision of the most relevant contributions to this modeling approach, 
we present the matrices and the variables upon which the model of the next section is built.  
 
Although the SFC methodology had been used for decades, it was the publication of Wynne 
Godley and Marc Lavoie’s book in 2007 that provided a number of benchmark models that 
paved the way for a growing number of contributions. The success of these models in 
anticipating the events that would end up triggering the GFC25 was also helpful in gaining 
attention from different strands of heterodox economics.  
 
According to Zezza and Zezza (2019, 135–36), SFC models rely on five principles: i) horizontal 
consistency, which means that the model accounting should record each payment as an outflow 
for one sector and an inflow for a different sector, identifying who pays whom; ii) vertical 
consistency, which implies that each payment/receipt should be recorded once in the current 
account of the sector involved, and at least once more as a change in the assets/liabilities of that 
 
24 This question is not treated in this draft, but will be dealt with in later versions of the paper. 
25 For a detailed description of how the SFC logic underlies most of the analysis that warned about increasing 
fragility years before the crisis, see Bezemer (2010).  
23 
 
sector; iii) flows-to-stock consistency, which means that any stock of real and financial assets at 
current prices at the end of the accounting period is given by its previous value plus the 
corresponding flows and net capital gains during the period; iv) balance sheet consistency, 
which implies that the financial assets of a sector must match the financial liabilities of one or 
more sectors, possibly matching creditors to debtors; and v) stock-to-flows feedbacks, which 
account for the fact that financial liabilities imply future payments from one sector (debtor) to 
another (creditor). From these principles one can see the intrinsic dynamic nature of SFC 
models, as well as the path-dependence that characterizes the results these models produce. 
Another important feature derived from these principles is that stock variables can influence the 
dynamics of flows through the behavioral equations. Overall, the benefit of adopting an SFC 
methodology in empirical model building—compared to flow models—is in laying down the 
interconnections between balance sheets and flows of payments (Zezza and Zezza 2019, 136). 
 
A benchmark empirical SFC model upon which later contributions would build can be found in 
Zezza (2009). This model describes the US economy as composed of three aggregate sectors: 
the private sector (containing households, nonfinancial corporations, and banks), the public 
sector, and the external sector. Although the financial component of the model (the flow-of-
funds matrix) is rather simple, the model is able to produce important insights into the dynamics 
of the US economy. Later on, Papadimitriou, Nikiforos, and Zezza (2013) use this same 
structure to analyze the case of Greece, giving birth to the Levy Institute Model for Greece 
(LIMG). These two models are regularly used to produce reports on the economic performance 
and sustainability of Greece and the United States. More recently, there has been a growing 
interest in this modeling approach, leading to the development of new country models.  
 
Burgess et al. (2016) build a model for the United Kingdom, which they use to examine the 
performance of the economy under several scenarios, such as increases in banks’ capital ratios, 
sudden stops, changes in investment, increases in house prices, and fiscal expansions. An 
important contribution of this model is that it disaggregates the private sector into four different 
subsectors: households, nonfinancial corporations, banks, and insurance companies and pension 
funds. Passarella (2019) builds a medium-scale model with annual data to study the effect of 
different fiscal policy stances in the evolution of financial balances. More recently, Pierros 
(2020) builds upon the LIMG model to incorporate labor market institutions to address the 
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effects of changes in income distribution on the sustainability of the Greek economy. Bryalsen 
and Raza (2020) build a model for Denmark to study the bidirectional relationships between the 
real and financial sides of the economy under fiscal and monetary shocks. Finally, Zezza and 
Zezza (2020) develop a quarterly model for Italy with a detailed description of the private sector 
and the real and financial interactions between households, nonfinancial corporations, and 
banks.   
 
In the specific case of Argentina, the closest precedent to the model presented here was 
developed by Panigo et al. (2009). In this paper the authors build a structural macroeconomic 
model to study the effects of different fiscal policies. The model is capable of capturing the 
interdependences between supply and aggregate demand and their implications for economic 
growth. It also includes income distribution aspects and the factors that determine the balance of 
payments constraints on growth. Their description of the impact of aggregate demand on 
growth, both in the short and long term, is fundamentally defined through the introduction of 
dynamic economies of scale. The model is made up of 13 behavioral equations, 15 accounting 
identities, and 17 exogenous variables. The set of exogenous variables includes those related to 
the international context (world output, international interest rate, or external labor productivity) 
and fiscal policy variables (tax rates, interest rates, public spending, etc.). According to the 
authors, the predictive capacity of the model, both in sample and out of sample, is good enough 
to consider the model a valid approximation of Argentina’s economy. 
 
Another relevant precedent of a structural macroeconometric model for Argentina was 
developed by Serino (2009), who builds a structuralist computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model to study the response of the economy’s main variables to different shocks in international 
commodity prices and the economic policies that the government may adopt in these situations. 
The author highlights the convenience of using a structural CGE for his object of analysis: the 
interactions between economic sectors with different characteristics and their particular 
responses to the shocks under consideration. The structuralist orientation of the work is 
expressed in the sectoral distinctions introduced in the model: a differentiation is made between 
the primary tradable sector (that is capable of competing in global markets) and the rest of the 
tradable sectors (which need protection to survive). The model also makes distinctions within 
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the services sector: the one oriented to production activities, whose dynamics affect the 
competitiveness of the tradable sector, and the consumption-oriented services sector. 
 
More recently Guaita and Michelena (2019) developed an empirical model based on a social 
accounting matrix previously built by Michelena et al. (2017). Their model intends to provide a 
benchmark for analyzing economic performance under different economic policy scenarios and 
exogenous shocks. It consists of a single-good, open economy with five sectors (production, 
households, firms and banks, the government, and the rest of the world). The model provides an 
explicit description of price determination, the labor market, and portfolio choices. They 
conduct two simulation exercises: one where there is a negative exogenous shock in the terms of 
trade and another one where the growth of the rest of the world increases, in both cases 
obtaining reasonable results.        
 
Structure of the Model 
The model developed in this and the next section rests on the Levy Economics Institute of Bard 
College’s approach and therefore consists of four institutional agents: the private sector (which 
comprises households, firms, and banks), the government, the central bank, and the rest of the 
world. The model includes eight financial assets and one single real asset: capital. These are all 
presented in the balance sheet (table 1). The private sector keeps its wealth under the form of 
money (𝐻), bills issued by the central bank (𝐵), bonds issued by the government (𝐷𝐷), and 
foreign assets (𝐹𝐴), which are a liability of the rest of the world. The private sector’s only 
liability is given by the external debt (𝐸𝐷 ), which includes the different types of liabilities that 
arise from the firms’ financing in foreign markets. The private sector accumulates capital 
(𝑘 𝑃 ) as a result of investment (net of depreciation). The government covers its financing 
needs through three different types of liabilities: the domestic debt purchased by the private 
sector, the external debt that is purchased by the rest of the world (𝐸𝐷 ), and the advances 
provided by the central bank (𝐴). The government also keeps deposits in dollars (𝐷 ) at the 
central bank and accumulates capital (𝑘 𝑃 ) as a result of public investment. The assets and 
liabilities that compose the balance sheets of the central bank and the rest of the world have 




Table 1: Balance Sheet 
   
 
Since the foreign assets held by the private sector and central bank, as well as the external debt 
issued by both the private sector and the government are all denominated in US dollars, the 
movements in the exchange rate give rise to revaluation effects. The changes in the price of 
capital goods can also lead to revaluation effects for both the private sector and the government. 
These revaluation effects are summarized in the revaluation account (table 2). 
 
Table 2: Revaluation Account 
 
 
The transactions flow matrix (table 3) captures all the flows arising from the interactions 
between the institutional agents in the model. The upper part of the matrix (until the saving 
account) consists of the social accounting matrix, which includes all the current transactions that 
take place within a certain period. As a result of these transactions of production, income, and 
spending, each institutional agent obtains a financial result, which we call “saving” or “net 
lending.” The lower part of the matrix is the flow-of-funds. This submatrix registers the changes 
in the financial assets and liabilities of the agents in the economy. For every agent the sum of 
these changes equals the change in its net worth, which in turn must be equal to its saving. The 
fact that each column is equal to zero implies that ex post the budget constraint of each agent is 
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always fulfilled. However, this does not imply any specific order of causality in the fulfillment 
of the budget constraint.   
 
The model consists of a single-good economy where domestic production is captured by GDP. 
Production is assumed to be demand-led (inventories are neglected) and carried out by firms and 
households. Firms use labor (formal and informal), capital, and imported intermediate goods as 
inputs. Households contribute to production through the supply of labor services to firms 
(compensation for which is given by wages) and through self-employment (which is 
compensated for by mixed income). Public employment, which comprises the bulk of public 
consumption and is supplied by households, is also part of aggregate demand. For the sake of 
simplicity, it is assumed that all imported goods are purchased by firms as part of the production 
process. 
 
The production sector pays households a wage in exchange for their labor services. It is 
assumed that mixed income is also paid by the production sector to households. Both the wage 
paid by the government and public employment are considered exogenous. Private employment, 
both formal and informal, is endogenous and mainly determined by the level of activity. Private 
wages are also endogenous and depend mainly on the level of employment and inflation 
expectations. Self-employment and its compensation (mixed income) are assumed to be 
exogenous. 
 
The production sector receives subsidies from the government as part of the regulation of the 
price of utilities, such as electricity, gasoline, and public transportation (𝑁𝑇). Indirect taxes, 
such as the value-added tax (VAT), are paid to the government.26 The difference between the 
productions sector’s sales (net of the value-added tax) and the wage bill plus the subsidies 
received from the government gives the gross profits (𝐹) or gross operating surplus (GOS) that 
are realized by firms (which belong to the private sector).  
 
 
26 Although this tax is paid by households when they consume final goods and services, their inclusion in this 
section of the matrix follows from the need to be consistent in the valuation of the different variables. While the 
components of aggregate demand are valued at market prices, the variables included in the income generation 
account are written at basic prices. Moreover, the deduction of the value-added tax from the value of the final sales 
is necessary because otherwise the gross operating surplus would be overestimated. 
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The line denoting taxes in the transactions flow matrix comprises a broad range of transactions 
from the private sector to the government. Households pay 40 percent of the total contributions 
to the social security system and 50 percent of subnational taxes. The sum of these two items 
plus the income tax paid by medium- and high-income workers gives the total taxes paid by 
households to the government (𝑇 ). The remaining part of tax collection is assumed to be paid 
by firms (𝑇 ). These include the remaining part of the contributions to the social security 
network, the other half of subnational taxes, and other taxes (such as income taxes paid by 
corporations and export duties). This level of detail in the description of taxes is made to allow 
for specific simulation exercises. 
 




Social security benefits (SS), which include pensions and diverse cash transfer programs, are 
paid by the government entirely to households. For households, these benefits make up an 
additional component of disposable income, which also includes all the other transfers 
(unspecified for the purpose of the model) from the government to the private sector (OE).  
 
The model includes eight financial assets, four of which entail the payment of interest. In the 
case of government deposits in foreign currency held at the central bank it is assumed that no 
interest accrues because the value of the flow is very low all along the time span. The same 
applies to foreign assets held by the private sector and the central bank. In the case of money 
there is no interest by definition. It should be noted that the interest payments accrued from the 
external debt—issued by the private sector and government—are originally paid in US dollars. 
Thus, these flows must be transformed into domestic currency through the nominal exchange 
rate.     
 
The saving of each institutional agent is obtained as a result of the sum of all the current 
transactions in the social accounting matrix. For instance, in the case of the private sector, 
saving (𝑆 ) is given by the difference between current income and outlays. Current income is 
given by the sum of the total wage bill (public and private), mixed income, gross profits, social 
security benefits, other expenditures of the government, and income derived from the holding of 
financial assets. Current outlays consist of private consumption and investment, taxes, and the 
interest accrued from liabilities. The same logic applies to the other institutional agents. Since 
the saving of each agent is logically and economically dependent on the incomes and outlays of 
other institutional agents, it must be the case that in the aggregate the overall flow of net lending 
is equal to zero, as is derived from the horizontal sum of the components in the saving line.  
 
𝑆 𝑆 𝑆 𝑆 0 
 
Since the government and the central bank constitute the public sector, this equation can be 
rewritten in such a way that it represents the well-known identity that states that the sum of the 
three sectors’ saving must always be equal to zero or, phrased differently, that the sum of public 




𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 0 
 
Construction of the Transactions Flow Matrix 
Since there are no officially published social accounting matrices and flow-of-funds tables, the 
transactions flows matrix has to be built using different data sources that are not always 
mutually consistent.27 Moreover, the lack of an official framework upon which to base the 
construction of these tools that constitute the cornerstone of SFC modeling makes the definition 
of the scope of the model (mainly the number of institutional agents and quantity of financial 
assets) more arbitrary than usual. In this subsection three issues are addressed simultaneously. 
First, the data sources of the variables used in the model are defined. Second, some important 
variables, which are not directly observed or for which there are no official data sources, are 
obtained implicitly (for instance, the average interest rate on the external private debt can be 
computed as the ratio between the flow of interest payments and outstanding stock of debt). 
Finally, some adjustment variables are created to ensure that all the accounting identities are 
fulfilled. 
 
A first clarification that needs to be made is that the institutional agent called “government” is 
given by the aggregate of the central government and the provincial administrations, i.e., the 
general government. The data on the components of aggregate demand were collected from 
National Institute of Statistics and Surveys (INDEC). The same data source was used to obtain 
the public employees’ compensation, which is a component of aggregate demand. The part of 
government expenditures directed to firms (𝐺𝐶 ) was computed as the difference between total 
public consumption and the compensation of public employees.  
 
The public wage bill is given by the product of the public wage and public employment (𝐿 ). 
The private wage bill has two components: formal and informal employment (𝐿 and 𝐿 , 
respectively). An important part of employment in Argentina takes the form of self-
employment, which is compensated for by mixed income. The average wage paid by both the 
private and public sector (𝑤  and 𝑤 , respectively) were computed as the quotient of the wage 
 
27 Zezza and Zezza (2019) show that even for countries with more resources to produce good statistics like the 
United States, there might be large discrepancies between the different data sources.  
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bill and the number of employed workers, both formal and informal (which was taken from 
INDEC). Since the information on the generation of income account is only available starting in 
2016Q1, the time series were extended backward using the series of the average wage (both 
public and private) produced by the Employment and Business Dynamics Observatory (OEDE). 
For the case of mixed income, it was assumed that the compensation (𝑤 ) followed the same 
time path as the wages of private sector workers.   
 
𝑊𝐵 𝑤 𝐿            (A) 
 
𝑊𝐵 𝑤 𝐿 𝐿           (B) 
 
𝑀𝐼 𝑤 𝐿           (C) 
 
All the data related to the fiscal block of the model (value-added tax collection, income taxes, 
export duties, contributions to the social security network, and provincial taxes) were obtained 
from INDEC. Subsidies, which in the transactions flow matrix are comprised of the net taxes on 
the production account, are given by the current transfers of the nonfinancial public sector to the 
private sector. The transfers included in the social security variable are the social security 
benefits, which are also informed by data from INDEC.  
 
The information on these flows is not only useful for building the transactions flow matrix, but 
also to implicitly compute some rates that can work as proxies for very important fiscal policy 
tools. The value-added tax rate (𝜏 ) is computed as the ratio of the total value-added tax 
collected to nominal private consumption. The income tax rate paid by households (𝜏 ) is given 
by the ratio of the corresponding flow (𝐼𝑇 ) to the total wage bill. The income tax rate paid by 
firms (𝜏 ) is given by the ratio of the corresponding flow (𝐼𝑇 ) to gross profits. The average 
export duty (𝜏 ) is computed as the ratio of the total flow of export duties paid to the 
government (𝑋𝑇) to nominal exports expressed in domestic currency (𝑋). Finally, the 
contribution rate of households and firms (𝜏 , and 𝜏 , ) to the social security network are 
calculated as the ratio between the payment that each sector makes and the wage bill comprising 
formal workers.   
32 
 
𝜏             (D) 
 
𝜏            (E) 
 
𝜏             (F) 
 
𝜏             (G) 
 
𝜏 ,           (H) 
 
𝜏 ,             (I) 
 
The current transfers to the private sector are assumed to be entirely sent to firms under the form 
of subsidies as part of the utility price regulation policy. Taking electricity as a reference, it is 
possible to compute the average subsidy rate using the following equation, where 𝑃 is the 
regulated price of electricity (the price paid by users) and 𝐴𝑀𝐶is the average cost. Both 
variables are taken from the management company of the wholesale electricity market 
(CAMMESA).28 Taking the real demand for electricity (𝑑 ) and its actual cost (given by the 
average cost) it is possible to compute the nominal demand for electricity (𝐷 ). Knowing the 
average subsidy rate and the nominal demand for electricity,  we compute the transfers to the 
private sector for the purpose of keeping the price of electricity below the level of its costs 
(𝑁𝑇 ). Since the total transfers are known, it is then possible to compute the amount of the 
transfers that are used to keep the price of the remaining services at the target price set by the 
government (𝑁𝑇 ). Assuming that the subsidy rate for the rest of the public services is the same 




28 I am grateful to Esteban Serrani who helped me to find this information. 
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𝑠 1           (J) 
 
𝐷 𝑑𝑡
𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑀𝐶𝑡          (K) 
 
𝑁𝑇 𝐷 𝑠           (L) 
 
𝑁𝑇 𝑁𝑇 𝑁𝑇           (M) 
 
𝐷 𝐷           (N) 
 
The total amount of current transfers to households are obtained from the social security 
benefits informed by the INDEC data. Taking the number of beneficiaries (the retirees and the 
beneficiaries of the universal allowance per child are considered for the calculation, which 
account for the majority of the beneficiaries), informed by data from the National 
Administration of the Social Security (ANSES), it is possible to compute the average nominal 




          (O) 
 
The interest accrued from the holdings of foreign assets was computed using the federal funds 
rate (𝑟∗), which was obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. This (annual) rate 
was converted into its quarterly version and then applied to the stock of foreign assets held by 
households and the central bank in the previous period. The foreign assets held by the private 
sector were obtained from the international investment position, where the assets of the “other 
sectors” were taken.29 Since this time series is only available starting in 2016Q1, the series were 
completed backward using the change in the net acquisition of foreign assets of the private 
sector informed by data from the Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA).  
 
 
29 The explicitly defined sectors in the international investment position are the government, the central bank, and 
banks. Therefore, households and firms are both included in the “other sectors” variable. It is not possible to 
distinguish between the share of assets held by each of these two agents, therefore, it was assumed that the totality 
of the assets is held by households. 
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The interest payments on the government’s external debt are obtained from the balance of 
payments published by the BCRA. Based on this flow and the outstanding stock of public 
external debt it is possible to compute the implicit rate of interest 𝑟 ∗(Zezza and Zezza 2019, 
140). The same procedure is followed to calculate the rate of interest on the private external 
debt. In order to do this it is first necessary to obtain the total interest paid by the private sector, 
which is obtained as the difference between the total outflows of foreign exchange 
corresponding to interest payments (taken from the balance of payments published by the 
BCRA) and the part that corresponds to the public external debt. The resulting implicit rates can 
eventually be used to analyze the impact of a change in the interest rate on the external 
sustainability of the economy.  
 
𝑟 ∗     
1
       (P) 
 
𝑟 ∗          
1
        (Q) 
 
The same method is replicated to compute the interest rate on the government’s internal debt, 
which is denominated in domestic currency. The flow of interest payments corresponding to the 
debt in domestic currency is obtained from the difference between the total interest payments 
made by the government (which are obtained from INDEC), the part of them that correspond to 
the external debt, and the interest payments derived from the advances provided by the central 
bank. The resulting interest payments are then divided by the stock of domestic debt (𝐷𝐷), 
which is computed as the sum of medium- and long-term bonds and bills issued by the 
government (data on which are obtained from Argentina’s Secretary of Finance).  
 
𝑟
         
1
    (I) 
 
For the interest payments on the bills issued by the central bank (𝐵), the monetary policy rate 
was used. The stock of outstanding bills was obtained from the BCRA. For the government’s 
interest payments to the central bank for the stock of outstanding advances (which were 
obtained from the BCRA’s balance sheet), the rate of interest on advances is used.  
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Since there are no officially published social accounting matrices and flow-of-funds tables, the 
construction of the transactions flows matrix has to be undertaken using different data sources 
that are not always mutually consistent. This poses the problem of the sum of the components 
that define each agent’s savings not necessarily matching the sum of the changes in that agent’s 
assets and liabilities. In other words, from the information collected for the construction of the 
transactions flow matrix there is nothing that ensures the fulfillment of the following three 
identities:  
 
𝑆 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑠       𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 𝑃,𝐺,𝐶𝐵,𝑅𝑊 
 
𝑆 𝐹𝑜𝐹                                                         𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 𝑃,𝐺,𝐶𝐵,𝑅𝑊 
 
𝑆 𝑅𝑒𝑣 , 𝛥𝑊                   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 𝑃,𝐺,𝐶𝐵,𝑅𝑊 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 𝐾,𝐹𝐴,𝐸𝐷 ,𝐸𝐷 ,𝐷   
 
where 𝑆 is saving, 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 is the sum of all the current income sources comprised in 
the social accounting matrix, 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑠 is the sum of all the current expenditures 
comprised in the social accounting matrix, 𝐹𝑜𝐹 is the sum of the variations of the elements that 
comprise the balance sheet of each agent 𝑖, 𝑅𝑒𝑣 is the revaluation effect derived from the 
variations in the nominal exchange rate and the price of capital goods, and 𝑊is the net worth.  
 
The first identity provides the usual definition of savings. The second identity states that each 
agent’s savings must equal the sum of the changes in its holdings of assets and liabilities. The 
third identity states that the change in the net worth of agent 𝑖 must equal the sum of the changes 
in its holdings of assets and liabilities (i.e., its savings) plus the revaluation effect that arises 
from the movements in the nominal exchange rate and the price of capital goods. Fulfilling 
these identities in an empirical model where the data sources are not complete is not easy 
because the production of the data of the different government agencies is not carried out in 
such a way that accounting consistency is attained. In order to make the model’s accounting 
consistent, some auxiliary flow and stock variables (𝐴𝐹 and 𝐴𝑆, respectively) are created, 
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following one of the methodologies suggested in Zezza and Zezza (2019, 138).30 The rules upon 
which these variables are built is the following:  
 







Let us begin with the rest of the world. Their net savings is given by the negative of the current 
account (CA) data from the BCRA. The current income and outlays are those presented in the 
social accounting matrix. The auxiliary flow variable is computed as the discrepancy between 
these two variables, which should be theoretically identical.31 The auxiliary stock variable is 
calculated as the difference between external saving (the negative of the current account), the 
auxiliary flow variables, and the sum of the changes in the components of the balance sheet. 
 
𝐴𝐹 𝐶𝐴 𝑋 𝐼𝑀 𝑟 1
∗ 𝐸𝐷 1 𝑟 1







𝐶𝐵 𝛥𝐹𝐴𝑡 𝐸𝑡    (T) 
 
In the case of the government a slightly different procedure is applied. Since all the elements 
that make up its savings are specified there is no need to include the auxiliary flow variable. The 
auxiliary stock variable is calculated as the difference between the savings of the government 
and the sum of the changes in the components of the balance sheet. 
 





𝑈𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑡 𝛥𝐷𝐷𝑡 𝛥𝐴𝑇𝑡 𝛥𝐸𝐷𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑡 𝛥𝑘𝑡
𝐺𝑃𝑡
𝐾     (V) 
 
30 The other option suggested by Zezza and Zezza (2019) consists of splitting the value of the discrepancy into the 
different components of each agent’s line or column. The pros of the chosen strategy are that model variables will 
exactly match the data, while the cons are that the number of model variables increases. The cons of Zezza and 
Zezza’s strategy would have been that model variables only would have approximated the actual data. 
31 The reason why these two variables do not exactly match is that not all the components of the current account are 
being taken into account. Thus, the auxiliary flow variable could be thought of as a variable that contains all the 
components that were omitted in order to keep the model simple.  
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The central bank’s net saving (𝑆 ) is calculated as the sum of the components of the social 
accounting matrix. However, since accounting consistency requires that the sum of the 
components of each row adds up to zero, the central bank’s auxiliary flow variable is defined in 
such a way that this condition is met. For its part, the auxiliary stock variable is computed as the 
difference between the savings and the sum of the changes in the components of the balance 
sheet. 
 






𝐶𝐵𝐸𝑡 𝛥𝐴𝑇𝑡 𝛥𝐻𝑡 𝛥𝐵𝑡 𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑡 𝛥𝐷𝑡
𝑈𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑡  (X) 
 𝛥𝐸𝐷 𝐸 𝛥𝐴𝑆2  
 
Finally, the closure of the private sector’s budget constraint must be coherent with all the assets, 
liabilities, and current transactions of the other institutional agents. The fact that these 
accounting relations must always hold can be used to compute some of the variables that are not 
directly observable or found in the official data sources. The private sector’s savings are defined 
as the residual of the savings of the rest of the institutional agents in the economy. The same 
logic is applied to defining the change in the auxiliary stock variable of households. The 
incorporation of this additional component to the flow-of-funds requires an extra adjustment 
variable that ensures the consistency between the private sector’s savings and the flow-of-
funds.32 The households’ auxiliary flow variable is defined so that net savings and current 
transactions of the social accounting matrix are mutually consistent as well.  
 
𝑆 𝑆 𝑆 𝑆          (Y) 
 
𝛥𝐴𝑆 𝛥𝐴𝑆 𝛥𝐴𝑆 𝛥𝐴𝑆         (Z) 
 
𝛥𝐴𝑆2 𝑆 𝛥𝐹𝐴 𝛥𝐵 𝛥𝐷𝐷 𝛥𝐻 𝛥𝐴𝑆 𝛥𝐸𝐷 𝐸 𝛥𝑘 𝑃   (AA) 
 
𝐴𝐹 𝑆 𝑊𝐵 𝐹 𝑆𝑆 𝑇 𝑇 𝑖 1𝐵 1 𝑖 1𝐷𝐷 𝑖 1
∗ 𝐸𝐷 1𝐸 𝐶 𝛥𝑘 𝑃  (AB) 
 
32 This auxiliary stock variable is assumed to enter as a liability for the central bank, as reflected in equation (U). 
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One last adjustment that is required in order to achieve full accounting consistency in the 
transactions flow matrix is to write two auxiliary variables that account for the discrepancy 
between the trade flows as defined in the national accounts (published in both constant and 
current pesos) and the balance of payments statistics (published in current US dollars). By 
writing these variables we make sure that the sum of the components of the lines corresponding 
to exports and imports also add up to zero.  
 
𝐴𝑢𝑥 𝑋 𝐸 𝑋          (AC) 
 
𝐴𝑢𝑥 𝐼𝑀 𝐸 𝐼𝑀          (AD) 
  
 
5. THE MODEL 
 
In this section we present the system of difference equations that represent Argentina’s 
economy. As is the case of every SFC model, the equations are derived from the structure of the 
transactions flow matrix. The model is composed of 68 endogenous variables, 17 of which are 
estimated econometrically (the results of the estimations are presented in the appendix). The 
remaining variables are determined through accounting identities that are derived from the 
transactions flow matrix, thereby ensuring the accounting coherence of the model. The model 
has 57 exogenous variables, 18 of which are considered policy variables, i.e., instruments that 
the government can change to pursue a specific goal. Table 4 summarizes the policy variables. 
A summary of all the model’s variables is presented in the appendix. Lower (upper) case 











Table 4: Policy Variables     
Policy tool Symbol 
Real public investment 𝑖  
Nominal public wage 𝑤  
Public employment 𝐿  
Government nominal operating expenditure 𝐺𝐶  
Subsidy rate to the price of utilities 𝑠 
Allowance (cash transfer) 𝐴𝐿 
Number of beneficiaries of cash transfer programs 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 
Value-added tax rate 𝜏  
Income tax rate for households 𝜏  
Income tax rate for firms 𝜏  
Social security contribution rate (households) 𝜏 ,  
Social security contribution rate (firms) 𝜏 ,  
Export duty rate 𝜏  
Consumption credit 𝐶𝑅 
Short-term interest rate 𝑟 
Interest rate on advances 𝑟  
Advances 𝐴 
Foreign reserves 𝐹𝐴  
 
Production and Employment 
Production is assumed to be demand-led (equation [1]). Real investment is composed of both 
private and public investment (equation [2]). The latter is assumed exogenous and is part of the 
policy toolkit of the government. Public consumption is assumed to be entirely exogenous and 
given by the sum of the wages paid by the public administration and other operating 
expenditures, which are purchases of goods and services from the production sector (equation 
[3]). Public consumption, mainly the wages component, is a nominal variable that needs to be 





𝑦 𝑐 𝑖 𝑔 𝑥 𝑖𝑚          (1) 
  
𝑖 𝑖 𝑖            (2) 
 
𝐺 𝑊𝐵 𝐺𝐶           (3) 
 
𝑊𝐵 𝑤 𝐿            (4) 
 
𝑔            (5) 
 
Private consumption, investment, exports, and imports are endogenous variables that are 
estimated in the corresponding blocks of the model. In order to transform the nominal exports 
and imports into US dollars (as they are published in the balance of payments statistics), the 
procedure presented in equations (8–11) is followed. Then it is possible to obtain the nominal 
version of GDP, which is given by the sum of the nominal components of aggregate demand. In 
order to compute them, the corresponding price indices are used. 
 
𝐶 𝑐 𝑝            (6) 
 
𝐼 𝑖 𝑝            (7) 
 
𝑋 𝑋 𝐸 𝐴𝑢𝑥          (8) 
 
𝑥 𝑋 /𝑝            (9) 
 
𝐼𝑀 𝐼𝑀 𝐸 𝐴𝑢𝑥          (10) 
 
𝑚 𝐼𝑀 /𝑝           (11) 
 




The production sector pays wages to households (included in the private sector) in exchange for 
their labor services. The wage bill comprises not only the formal sector but also the informal 
(equation [13]). Self-employment, which is considered exogenous, and its compensation 
determine mixed income (equation [14]). Formal employment is given by the level of activity 
and unit labor costs (equation [15]). The values of the coefficients are estimated using an error 
correction equation, which explains the presence of the EC term in the equation. Informal 
employment is estimated as a ratio of formal employment, and is also determined by the level of 
activity and GDP volatility (defined as the standard deviation of real GDP in the last four 
periods). The values of the coefficients, estimations of which are presented in the appendix, are 
summarized in table 5. Given production and employment it is possible to compute labor 
productivity (equation [17]). Nominal unit labor costs are given by the ratio of the wage paid in 
the private sector and labor productivity (equation [18]). 
 
𝑊𝐵 𝑤𝑡𝑃 𝐿 𝐿           (13) 
 
𝑀𝐼 𝑤 𝐿            (14) 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐿𝑡
𝐹 𝜂0 𝜂1𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑦𝑡 𝜂2𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐿𝑡 1
𝐹 𝜂3𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑢𝑙𝑐𝑡 1/𝑝𝑡 1
𝐶 𝜂4𝐸𝐶𝑡 1




𝐹 𝜂5 𝜂6𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑦𝑡 𝜂7𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐿𝑡 1
𝐼 /𝐿𝑡 2
𝐹 𝜂8𝐸𝐶𝑡 1
𝐿𝐼    (16) 
 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑           (17) 
 
𝑢𝑙𝑐            (18)                      
 
Table 5: Employment Equations Coefficients 
𝜂0 0 𝜂1 0.05 𝜂2 0.77 𝜂3 0.03 𝜂4 0.18 




In this model the net taxes on production are only given by the subsidies that the government 
grants as part of the utility price regulation policy. The nominal demand for electricity is 
computed as the product of the real demand and the cost (equation [19]). The current transfers to 
the production sector to subsidize the final price of electricity are given by the nominal demand 
and the subsidy rate, which is exogenous and part of the government’s policy toolkit (equation 
[20]). The same is done for the other public utilities (equation [21]). Adding these two sources 
of current transfers we obtain the net taxes on production (equation [22]). The price of utilities is 
given by the average cost (which is assumed to be exogenous) adjusted by the subsidy rate 
(equation [23]).33 The real demand for electricity is a function of private consumption (equation 
[24]). The nominal demand for the other utilities is mainly given by output, the rate of capacity 
utilization, and the nominal demand for electricity (equation [25]).   
 
𝐷 𝑑 𝐴𝑀𝐶           (19) 
 
𝑁𝑇 𝐷 𝑠           (20) 
 
𝑁𝑇 𝐷 𝑠            (21) 
 
𝑁𝑇 𝑁𝑇 𝑁𝑇          (22) 
 
𝑃 1 𝑠 𝐴𝑀𝐶           (23) 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑑𝑡
𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶 𝜀0 𝜀1𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑐𝑡 𝜀2𝐸𝐶𝑡 1
𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐       (24) 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑡
𝑂 𝜀3 𝜀4𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑌𝑡 𝜀5𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑢𝑡 1 𝜀6𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑡
𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶 𝜀7𝐸𝐶𝑡 1






33 For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that the cost of production and the electricity subsidy rate and that of the 
other utilities are the same. Future versions of the model should provide a more detailed description of the cost 
structure of the different utilities where the government has a price regulation policy. Yet, splitting utilities into 




Table 6: Public Services Equation Coefficients 
𝜀 0 𝜀 0.14 𝜀 0.11 𝜀 0.02 
𝜀 1.73 𝜀 0.01 𝜀 0.94 𝜀 0.67 
 
As a result of production, sales, and the payment of wages and net taxes on production, the 
production sector obtains a profit that is transferred entirely to the private sector. Recall that 
accounting consistency requires that the income that is distributed among the different members 
of the private sector is net of indirect taxes such as the value-added tax. The value-added tax is 
given by the level of nominal consumption and the tax rate, which is an exogenous policy tool 
(equation [26]). It should also be noted that the part of GDP that corresponds to the 
compensation of public employment is not part of the production sector’s income. Equation (27) 
thereby ensures that the accounting relationship described in the production sector column of the 
transactions flow matrix is always fulfilled.    
 
𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝐶 𝜏           (26) 
 
𝐹 𝑌 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑊𝐵 𝑊𝐵 𝑀𝐼 𝑁𝑇       (27) 
 
Private Sector 
The main revenue sources of the private sector are the profits transferred from production and 
the payment of wages by both production and the government. The private sector also receives 
social benefits from the government, which are in turn given by three exogenous variables: the 
number of beneficiaries, the average allowance (both decided by the central government), and 
the current transfers of provincial governments to households, which are taken as exogenous. 
 
𝑆𝑆 𝐴𝐿 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝑇         (28) 
 
Households and firms pay different types of taxes to the government. In the case of households, 
they pay the income tax, contributions to the social security network, and local taxes. Both the 
income tax (equation [30]) and contributions to social security (equation [31]) are given by the 
respective tax rate and wage bill earned by formal workers (employed in both the private and 
public sectors). Local taxes paid by households (𝑇𝑃 ) are assumed to be exogenous. In the case 
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of firms, they pay income tax (equation [33]), export duties (equation [34]), and contributions to 
the social security network (equation [35]), which depend on profits, nominal exports, and the 
formal private wage bill, respectively. Firms also pay local taxes (𝑇𝑃 ), which are exogenous. 
 
𝑇 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝐼𝑇 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 𝑇𝑃        (29) 
 
𝐼𝑇 𝑤 𝐿 𝑤 𝐿 𝜏          (30) 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 𝑤 𝐿 𝑤 𝐿 𝜏 ,         (31) 
 
𝑇 𝐼𝑇 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 𝑇𝑋 𝑇𝑃         (32) 
 
𝐼𝑇 𝐹 𝜏            (33) 
 
𝑇𝑋 𝑋 𝜏            (34) 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇 𝑤 𝐿 𝜏 ,           (35) 
 
The specification of the consumption equation requires that we first define how the private wage 
is determined. Equation (36) presents the evolution of the wage in the private formal sector as a 
function of employment in the formal sector and inflation. 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑤𝑡𝐹 𝜛0 𝜛1𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐿𝑡 1
𝐹 𝜛2𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑡 1
𝐶 𝜛3𝐸𝐶𝑡 1
𝑊     (36) 
 
Table 7: Private Wage Equation Coefficients 
𝜛0 0.04 𝜛1 0.97 𝜛2 0.34 𝜛3 0.23 
 
The consumption equation follows a Keynesian structure, disposable income being its main 
driver. In order to account for the different propensities to consume within the subsectors that 
compose the private sector (formal workers, informal workers, pensioners, capitalists, etc.), the 
consumption equation distinguishes between the different sources of income. Equation (37) 
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gathers the disposable income of formal workers34 and equation (38) the income of informal 
workers plus all the benefits provided by the social security network. Equation (39) defines the 
firm owners’ disposable income. These three income sources are deflated using the private 
consumption deflator index. Note that in the consumption equation (equation [40]) the profits 
are also written in real terms (𝑓) and one control variable is included: the nominal interest rate 
(𝑟). Unlike the standard consumption functions used in SFC models, equation (40) does away 
with wealth effects. This decision was made after having tested for alternative specifications, all 
of which yielded nonsignificant results.   
 
𝑦𝑑1          (37) 
 
𝑦𝑑2           (38) 
 
𝑓            (39) 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑐 𝛼0 𝛼1𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑦𝑑1 𝛼2𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑦𝑑2 𝛼3𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑓 𝛼4𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑟 𝛼5𝐸𝐶 1 (40) 
 
The private investment equation included in the model is rather eclectic, as it depends on many 
factors such as the rates of capacity utilization, interest, and profit (defined as the ratio of real 
profits to the stock of capital). Some control variables that account for factors that could have an 
effect on the state of capitalists’ confidence, like the environment for “doing business” (which is 
proxied by the intensity of capital controls on outflows, since in Argentina these measures have 
brought about parallel exchange rates that end up inducing short-term speculative behaviors), 
the nominal exchange rate (in Argentina periods of devaluations are associated with instability), 
and the international price of commodities (during commodity booms investment in the primary 
sector might be encouraged), are also included in the estimation.    
 
 
34 Mixed income is taken as part of this income source given the large number of professional workers that 






𝜅0 𝜅1𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑢𝑡 1 𝜅2𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑟𝑡 1 𝜅3𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 𝜅4𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐸𝑡 1   





𝜅8𝐸𝐶 1    (41) 
 
Table 8: Consumption and Investment Equation Coefficients 
𝛼0 0 𝛼1 0.35 𝛼2 0.04 𝛼3 0.17 𝛼4 0.08 
𝛼5 0.32 𝛼6 0.75 𝜂7 0.01 𝜅0 0.01 𝜅1 0.31 
𝜅2 0.09 𝜅3 0 𝜅4 0.22 𝜅5 0.29 𝜅6 0.14 
𝜅7 0.46 𝜅8 0.69    
 
The last component of the private sector’s current transactions are interest payments. The 
private sector pays interest on the outstanding stock of external debt. Regarding interest 
earnings, the private sector receives payments on its holdings of bills and bonds. Once all the 
current incomes and outlays have been defined, it is possible to write the equation for private 
savings (equation [42]). 
 
𝑆 𝑊𝐵 𝑊𝐵 𝑀𝐼 𝐹 𝑇 𝑇 𝑆𝑆 𝑂𝐸 𝑟 𝐵 𝑟 𝐷𝐷  
      𝑟 1
∗ 𝐸𝐷 1𝐸 𝐴𝐹 𝐶 𝐼         (42) 
 
The change in the real capital stock is given by investment minus depreciation (equation [43]). 
The change in the nominal capital stock must take into account the change in prices (equation 
[44]). The rate of capacity utilization is given by the level of activity, the technical coefficient 𝑣, 





𝑃           (43) 
 
𝐾 𝑘 𝑝            (44) 
 
𝑢            (45) 
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The model’s stock-flow consistency requires that, after having accounted for the change in the 
stock of capital, the newly generated wealth (which is equal to private saving) is accumulated 
under the form of net acquisition of financial assets. The private sector’s only liability—external 
debt—is assumed to be exogenous and given by the rest of the world’s demand for domestic 
assets. The private sector holds four different financial assets: foreign assets, bills, money, and 
bonds.35 The demand for bonds (equation [46]) is given by the interest rate on these assets and 
the market’s perception of economic risk, which is approximated by the volatility of the nominal 
exchange rate. The same logic is applied in the definition of the demand for foreign assets 
(equation [47]) and bills (equation [49]), where the stock of public external debt and the policy 
rate, respectively, are taken as key determinants. In the three cases, a nonlinear relationship is 
assumed between the dependent variable and the interest rate on bonds, the stock of public 
external debt, and the policy rate.36 Some control variables, like the price index and existence of 
capital controls, are also incorporated. Note that the acquisition of foreign assets by the private 
sector is written in domestic currency although the assets written on that line are denominated in 
US dollars. The reason for this is that the financial flow that gives rise to the acquisition of 
foreign assets is originally in domestic currency, since it is a result of the current transactions 
that take place within the local economy. The dollar version of the total stock of foreign assets 
held by the private sector is given by equation (48). The change in the private sector’s holding 
of money acts as the buffer that ensures the fulfillment of the balance sheet identity (equation 
[51]). The wealth of the private sector is given by the difference between assets and liabilities 
(equation [52]). In order to obtain the nominal capital stock, the price deflator of investment 
(𝑝 ) is used. Although the auxiliary stock variables as they were defined in the previous 
sections are all exogenous, the fact that the nominal exchange rate varies requires that equation 
(53) is explicitly included in the model.  
 
35 Although theoretical SFC models work with Tobinesque portfolio equations of the type proposed by Brainard 
and Tobin (1968) and Tobin (1969), it is not easy to build empirical approximations to the rate of return matrix 
embedded in this approach and to obtain estimators that respect its constraints. Some researchers, like Zezza and 
Zezza (2020), attempt to adapt the structure of the model to keep the main concepts embedded in Tobin’s theory. In 
this model a simpler path is taken by estimating equations separately with the caution of obtaining estimations that 
are consistent with the intuitions underlying those decisions.     
36 These equations are estimated using the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lags methodology, as proposed by 
Shin, Yu, and Greenwood-Nimmo (2014). This methodology assumes that the reaction of the dependent variable to 
changes in the independent variable varies according to the direction in which the change goes. For instance, the 
variable in the third term of the right-hand side of equation (46) gathers the accumulated sum of all the positive 
changes in the interest rate on bonds. On the other hand, in the variable in the fourth term, where the “-” sign 





𝑃 𝛾0 𝛾1𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑡 1
𝐶 𝛾2𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑟𝑡 1
𝐺 𝛾3𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑟𝑡 1
𝐺 𝛾4𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 1    





𝑃 𝛾9 𝛾10𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑡 1
𝐶 𝛾11𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐸𝐷𝑡 1
𝐺 𝛾12𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐸𝐷𝑡 1
𝐺 𝛾13𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 1  
       𝛾14∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝛾 𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝 𝛾16𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐸𝐷 𝛾17𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐸𝐷 1   (47) 
 




𝑃 𝛾18 𝛾19𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑡 1
𝐶 𝛾20𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑖𝑡 1 𝛾21𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑖𝑡 1 𝛾22𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 1  
  








𝑃𝐸𝑡 𝛥𝐵𝑡 𝛥𝐷𝐷𝑡 𝛥𝐴𝑆𝑡
𝑃 𝛥𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝑃𝐸𝑡     (51) 
 
𝑊 𝐾 𝐻 𝐵 𝐷𝐷 𝐹𝐴 𝐸 𝐴𝑆 𝐸𝐷 𝐸      (52) 
 
𝛥𝐴𝑆 𝛥𝐴𝑆 𝛥𝐴𝑆 𝛥𝐴𝑆 𝐸        (53) 
 
Table 9: Private Sector Portfolio Equation Coefficients 
𝛾0 0 𝛾1 0.27 𝛾2 1.58 𝛾3 1.44 𝛾4 0.08 
𝛾5 0.35 𝛾6 6.36 𝛾7 0.45 𝛾8 0.29 𝛾9 8.97 
𝛾10 0.28 𝛾11 0.42 𝛾12 0.04 𝛾13 0.03 𝛾14 0.69 
𝛾15 3.30 𝛾16 0.60 𝛾17 0.34 𝛾18 2.31 𝛾19 0.75 
𝛾20 1.08 𝛾21 0.01 𝛾22 0.31 𝛾23 3.23 𝛾24 0.57 
 
Government 
Public consumption, which is comprised of the sum of the compensation to public employees 
and the other operating expenditures, has already been defined in equations (3) and (4). The 
government subsidies to production and the current transfers to households as part of the social 
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security network were defined in equations (22) and (28). The government revenues from taxes 
from households and firms have also already been written in equations (29) and (32). The 
government pays interest to the private sector and the rest of the world on its stock of 
outstanding bonds and external debt, respectively. The only component of the social accounting 
matrix that is left to be defined is nominal public investment (equation [54]). The result of all 
these current transactions gives the government’s net savings (equation [55]).  
 
𝐼 𝑖 𝑝             (54) 
 
𝑆 𝑇 𝑇 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑁𝑇 𝐴𝐹 𝑆𝑆 𝑂𝐸 𝑟 1𝐷𝐷 1 𝑟 1
∗ 𝐸𝐷 1𝐸    
 𝐹 , 𝐺𝐶 𝐼          (55) 
 
The government has three sources of financing: bonds, advances, and external debt. The latter 
two are assumed to be exogenous. The possibility of issuing external debt depends on the rest of 
the world’s willingness to purchase domestic assets, which depends mostly on the interest rate 
adjusted for the risk premium. The direct financing from the central bank through advances is an 
exogenous decision made by the monetary authority. The supply of domestic bonds is, on the 
other hand, given by the private sector’s portfolio decisions. The buffer that ensures the 
fulfillment of the government’s balance sheet identity is given by the auxiliary stock variable 






𝐺𝐸𝑡      (56) 
 
Rest of the World 
The equation for exports incorporates different variables that, given the specificities of the 
productive structure of Argentina, are known to have a relevant impact in their determination. 
The production of primary goods (𝑦 ) is included as an explanatory variable because it 
reflects the possible supply-side constraints that can determine the volume of exports (for 
instance, droughts). Brazil’s growth rate (𝑦 ) is also an important factor, since many of the 
manufactured exports are directed to that country. The international price of commodities (𝑝∗) 
also tends to have a positive impact on exports. The real exchange rate (e) is a usual explanatory 
variable in this type of equation. In the case of imports, the main determinants are the domestic 
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level of activity and the real exchange rate. For simplicity, the real exchange rate is defined as 
the bilateral exchange rate with the US (equation [59]). 
 
∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋 𝜇 𝜇 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑦 𝜇 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑦 𝜇 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝∗ 𝜇 ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑒 𝜇 𝐸𝐶   (57) 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐼𝑀𝑡
𝑈𝑆𝐷 𝜇6 𝜇7𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑦𝑡 𝜇8𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑒𝑡 𝜇9𝐸𝐶𝑡 1
𝐼𝑀        (58) 
 
𝑒              (59) 
 
Table 10: Exports and Imports Equation Coefficients 
𝜇0 0 𝜇1 0.03 𝜇2 3.30 𝜇3 0.21 𝜇4 0.30 
𝜇5 0.36 𝜇6 0 𝜇7 1.47 𝜇8 0.59 𝜇9 1.17 
 
The rest of the world earns interest on its holdings of external debt issued by the private sector 
and the government. The sum of all the current transactions gives the current account, which is 
the negative of the savings of the rest of the world. In order to ensure accounting consistency, 
the current account must be transformed into domestic currency. 
 
𝑆 𝐶𝐴 𝐸 𝑋 𝐼𝑀 𝑟 1
∗ 𝐸𝐷 1 𝑟 1
∗ 𝐸𝐷 1 𝐴𝐹    (60)                    
 
The rest of the world’s demand for domestic assets, issued by both the private and public 
sectors, is considered exogenous. Finally, the change in the rest of the world’s supply of foreign 






𝑅𝑊      (61) 
 
Once the external sector of the economy has been coherently defined, it is possible to derive the 
nominal exchange rate as an accounting identity that ensures the fulfillment of the line that 
defines the market for foreign assets. This closure of the model is identical to the flexible 
exchange rate closure proposed by Godley and Lavoie (2007: ch. 12).       
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𝐸            (62) 
 
Central Bank 
The central bank’s savings are given by the difference between its income and outlays arising 
from interest payments. In this simplified description of the central bank, the only component of 
its savings are the interest payments that it pays to the private sector on its holdings of bills and 
the share of its profits that are transferred to the government.37 
 
𝑆 𝑟 𝐵 𝐹 ,          63) 
 
The central bank’s stock of external debt is assumed to be exogenous. The advances provided to 
the government and the net acquisition of foreign assets are defined as policy tools of the central 
bank. In the case of advances, they can be used to relieve the government’s need to issue bonds 
as a source of financing. In the case of the net acquisition of foreign assets, it can be used to 
pursue a certain exchange rate policy. The greater the purchases or sales of foreign reserves by 
the central bank, the greater its willingness to defend a certain level of the nominal exchange 
rate. Times of large purchases (sales) of foreign reserves can be interpreted as times of liquidity 
(scarcity) of foreign exchange in the domestic market and, thus, as situations where market 
forces produce nominal exchange rate appreciation (depreciation). The relationship between the 
change in the stock of foreign reserves and the nominal exchange rate can be observed in 
equation (62).   
 
Since the central bank’s external debt, advances, government deposits, foreign reserves, bills, 
and money are already given, there is no variable that can ensure that its balance sheet identity 
is fulfilled. As happens in every SFC model, the fulfillment of this equation should be logically 
derived from the n-1 equations of the model. This accounting relation is thus used to check the 
overall consistency of the model. 
 
 
37 The component that explains the possibility of the central bank having a positive profit is the capital gains that 
arise from its holdings of foreign reserves (as shown in the revaluation matrix presented in section 4). When the 




𝑆 𝛥𝐷 𝐸 𝛥𝐸𝐷 𝐸 𝛥𝐻 𝛥𝐵 𝛥𝐹𝐴 𝐸 𝛥𝐴 𝛥𝐴𝑆 0  
 
Prices 
The last component of the model that needs to be defined are the price indices, presented in 
equations (54–58). The estimation of the consumption deflator, which is taken as a proxy for the 
consumer price index, builds upon the previous work of Trajtenberg, Valdecantos, and Vega 
(2015) and Zack, Montané, and Kulfas (2018), who explicitly identify some of the supply-side 
determinants of price dynamics.  
 
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑡
𝐶 𝛽0 𝛽1𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑡 1
𝐶 𝛽2𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑢𝑙𝑐𝑡 𝛽3𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐸𝑡 𝛽4𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑡 1
𝑅    
               𝛽5𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝∗ 𝛽6𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑢 𝛽7𝐸𝐶 1      (64) 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑡
𝑋 𝛽8 𝛽9𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑡
𝐶 𝛽10𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐸𝑡 𝛽11𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑡
∗ 𝛽12𝐸𝐶𝑡 1
𝑃𝑋    (65) 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑡
𝐼𝑀 𝛽13 𝛽14𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑡
𝑈𝑆𝐴 𝛽15𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐸𝑡 𝛽16𝐸𝐶𝑡 1
𝑃𝑀     (66) 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝 𝛽17 𝛽18𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑢𝑙𝑐 𝛽19𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐸 𝛽20𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑟 𝛽21𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝 𝛽 𝐸𝐶  (67) 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑡
𝐺 𝛽23 𝛽24𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑤𝑡
𝐺 𝛽25𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐿𝑡
𝐺 𝛽26𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑖𝑡
𝐺 𝛽27𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐶𝑡    
  𝛽28𝐸𝐶 1          (68) 




Table 11: Price Equation Coefficients 
𝛽0 0 𝛽1 0.28 𝛽2 0.52 𝛽3 0.14 𝛽4 0.11 
𝛽5 0.01 𝛽6 0.42 𝛽7 0.81 𝛽8 0 𝛽9 0.40 
𝛽10 0.75 𝛽11 0.26 𝛽12 0.13 𝛽13 0 𝛽14 1.92 
𝛽15 0.84 𝛽16 0.31 𝛽17 0 𝛽18 0.43 𝛽19 0.31 
𝛽20 0.05 𝛽21 0.11 𝛽22 0.29 𝛽23 0 𝛽24 0.95 
𝛽25 1.26 𝛽26 0 𝛽27 0.10 𝛽28 0.40  
 
Equations (1–68) define the dynamic system that solves the model represented in the 
transactions flow matrix presented in table 3. The exogenous variables used to solve the model, 
both the ones defined as policy tools and the ones that are beyond the control of the government, 
are either obtained from official data sources or computed implicitly, as was described in the 
previous section. The model’s parameters were estimated econometrically, as is presented in the 
appendix. Figure 7 illustrates the model’s capacity to reproduce the actual dynamics of GDP and 
private wealth38 (the scenario consists of the model’s solution for the endogenous variables 
considering the actual values for the exogenous variables). As is observed, its fit seems to be 
very good, which suggests that the model is capable of providing valid approximations of the 









38 The model’s capacity to track the actual trajectory of a variable can be tested for any of the model’s endogenous 
variables. For the sake of simplicity only the model validation for GDP and private saving are presented. These are 
two variables are among the most endogenous variables of the model, as they are entirely composed of other 
endogenous variables—some of them behavioral and some of them accounting identities.    
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Figure 7: Model Validation 
  
 
In figure 8 we plot the model’s missing equation, i.e., the one describing the central bank’s 
balance sheet identity. As the graph shows, the structure of the model defined in this section 
fulfills the stock-flow consistency requirements upon which this modeling approach is built.   
 






Now that the model has been built and validated, the four research questions posed in section 3 
can be addressed. This requires simulating a scenario where some of the exogenous variables or 
parameters are changed according to the underlying proposal. For the first two simulations the 
sample that ranges from 2012Q1 to 2015Q4 is taken, i.e., the whole second mandate of 
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Fernández de Kirchner. In an attempt to examine what the macroeconomic performance could 
have been if the government had followed the prescriptions implied in each proposal, the 
exogenous variables are changed in the first simulation period.  
 
Question 1: The New Keynesian Shock 
The New Keynesian critique to the macroeconomic program pursued during the period 2012–15 
implies the following policy changes: 
 
○ Not imposing any type of capital controls39 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 1 0) 
○ Reducing sharply or eliminating the subsidies on utilities (𝑠 1 0.2) 
○ Increasing the interest rate such that the real interest rate is positive (𝑟 1 𝜋 1 0) 
○ Establishing a floating exchange rate regime (𝐹𝐴
1
𝐹𝐴 ) 
○ Resuming financial integration via public foreign indebtedness (𝐸𝐷
1
𝐸𝐷 1
, 11.05)     
 
The results of these policy changes are summarized in figures 10–12. But before analyzing the 
impacts of the whole economic policy package it is useful to examine the behavior of the model 
when only some of its components are implemented. In figure 9, we present the trajectories of 
the nominal exchange rate and inflation when a flexible exchange rate regime is established 
(i.e., when capital controls are not implemented and when the central bank does not intervene in 
the foreign exchange market) in 2012Q1. This floating regime is tested with the complete set of 
policies defined above and also without the reduction of subsidies and increase in foreign 
indebtedness. Since there are no capital controls preventing the private sector from acquiring 
foreign assets and because the central bank does not meet this demand by selling foreign 
reserves, the nominal exchange rate depreciates in all cases. However, the size of these 
movements varies. The highest depreciation is registered in the scenario where subsidies are 
removed, which is reasonable taking into account its inflationary effect and the sensibility of the 
private sector’s demand for foreign assets. Given a certain amount of foreign financing and 
assuming no central bank interventions, the demand for foreign assets translates into a higher 
exchange rate. As a result, inflation (plotted in the top-right panel) surges and reaches a higher 
 
39 Capital controls are defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 between 2012Q1 and 2015Q4. This 
variable is included in the long-term equations of the exchange rate, the residual of which is explicitly written in the 
short-term relation as reflected in equation (59). 
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rate than in the rest of the scenarios. In the medium run, however, this scenario stabilizes as the 
disinflation process reduces the acquisition of foreign assets. The oscillatory behavior of 
inflation is explained by the upward pressure that depreciations put on prices and the subsequent 
downward nominal wage adjustments that take place as a result of the contractionary effect of 
depreciations. Private savings exhibit better performance than in the actual scenario due to the 
positive effect that the contractionary devaluation has on the current account.  
 




The two scenarios where the flexible exchange rate is combined with the maintenance of the 
utility regulation policy (one with the external indebtedness, the other one without it) look very 
similar, the main difference being the relatively lower exchange rate that the availability of 
external financing implies. The evolution of private savings in these two cases exhibits a better 
performance than in the previous scenario, as the subsidies on utilities prevent the increase in 
inflation, the depreciation of the exchange rate (which still depreciates a bit as a result of the 
exchange rate regime switch), and the reduction in the level of activity. In this case, the 
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counterpart of the increase in private savings is partly given by the improvement of the current 
account and the worsening of the budget balance of the government.   
 
Unsurprisingly, these alternative policy combinations have different impacts on GDP. A first 
effect that should be taken into account considering the stylized facts of the Argentinean 
economy is the contractionary effect of devaluations. The avoidance of any type of capital 
control added to the establishment of a floating exchange rate regime produces an increase in 
the exchange rate. Although the devaluation induces an increase in exports40 (which explains the 
temporary increase in GDP observed in 2012Q1) the overall effect is contractionary. The 
channel is the one described by Díaz-Alejandro (1963) and Krugman and Taylor (1978), and is 
reflected in the evolution of inflation in the top right panel of figure 9. However, this 
contractionary effect is much larger when subsidies are removed (because it induces higher 
inflation in the long term, which adds to the upward pressure that the devaluation puts on the 
price level) and when there is no external financing (because the size of the devaluation is larger 
in the short term, as the market for foreign assets is entirely closed by a price adjustment). The 
only case where the opening of the capital account and the establishment of a flexible exchange 
rate minimizes the contractionary effect of the devaluation is when subsidies are kept and 
capital inflows offset the demand for foreign assets of the private sector.   
 
After having inspected the behavior of the model under different policy combinations, we focus 
on the specific scenario described before, i.e., the one that describes the New Keynesian critique 
to the policies actually implemented in the period 2012–15. The avoidance of any type of capital 
control added to the establishment of a floating exchange rate regime produces a devaluation, 
which is observed in the top-right panel of figure 10. Although the devaluation induces an 
increase in exports, the overall effect is contractionary due to the inflationary impact of the 
depreciation. The increase in inflation also obeys to the removal of subsidies on utilities, which 
ends up increasing their price and, therefore, the price of final goods. The nominal exchange 
rate exhibits a depreciating trend as a result of the aforementioned impulse mechanisms and also 
due to the increasing inflation and public foreign indebtedness which, as described in the 
 
40 The positive relationship between the real exchange rate and exports needs not be explained through an increase 
in the sales of manufactured goods to foreign markets, but by the liquidation of primary exports that are often 
accumulated as a stock to be sold only once a devaluation has occurred, thereby making a capital gain.  
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previous section, tends to be positively related to depreciations. However, there are periods 
where the exchange rate seems to stabilize as the rate of inflation diminishes, presumably 
reducing the private sector’s demand for foreign assets.  
 
It is also remarkable that while a program like this tends to be associated with the desirable 
conditions for doing business, investment shows a sharp decline. Several factors explain this 
poor performance: higher interest rates, negative growth (which negatively affects investment 
through the accelerator effect), and exchange rate depreciation. The sum of these three effects 
ends up outweighing the positive impact of the increased profit rate, which is mostly driven by 
the increase in prices.       
 
As inflation accelerates and both the private real wage and employment decrease, income 
distribution worsens, as shown in the bottom-left panel of figure 10. Although private wages 
dynamically adjust to the increase in prices, they do it with a lag. The situation of wages in the 
public and informal sector is harder. Moreover, employment is reduced as a result of the decline 
in economic activity, thereby reducing the bargaining power of workers and their capacity to 
maintain the purchasing power of the nominal wage. The wage share tends to recover when the 
inflation rate diminishes or stabilizes, as observed toward the end of the sample, which gives 
real private wages more room for recovering. The main driver of the oscillatory behavior of the 
inflation rate is unit labor costs (and more specifically private wages), which follows the 
evolution of inflation and level of activity. For instance, the disinflation observed from mid-
2014 to the end of 2015 is determined by the deceleration in the rate of increase of nominal 
wages induced by the reduction in employment. The real exchange rate, for its part, exhibits an 
oscillatory behavior explained by the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate and prices, which 
asynchronously push the real exchange rate into opposite directions (as observed in the bottom-
right panel of figure 10). Until 2014, the real exchange rate in the scenario is, on average, above 




41 It should be noted, however, that the better performance of the current account in the scenario is also explained 
by the reduction in imports, which fall all over the simulation in line with the drop in output. 
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Figure 11 plots the evolution of the sectoral financial balances, both for the baseline (the actual 
values for the period 2012–15) and the simulated scenario. The most salient feature of the 
simulations is that, as expected, the government’s financial balance improves significantly (as a 
result of the removal of subsidies). Although initially the improvement in the fiscal balance 
negatively affects private saving, after some periods the dynamics produced by this policy 
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program seem to be in line with the New Cambridge approach.42 As a result, the current account 
maintains the surplus position that was lost in the baseline, although the price of the 
preservation of the external equilibrium seems to be the deep economic contraction, as  reflected 
in the top-left panel of figure 10. The government’s financial balance stabilizes around a surplus 
of 2 percent of GDP until the beginning of 2015, where there is an exogenous increase in public 
spending both in the baseline and in the simulated scenario.43  
 




The fact that the government is running a surplus all along the simulation while simultaneously 
increasing its foreign indebtedness implies a reduction of the public debt denominated in 
domestic currency, which is, in turn, an asset for the private sector. This is made possible by the 
fact that the increasing inflation discourages the private sector from accumulating its wealth 
under the form of bonds denominated in domestic currency. However, since the private sector is 
running a surplus over almost the whole simulation, it must be the case that there is another 
component of the balance sheet that is increasing—both to compensate for the decrease in its 
holdings of bonds and to account for its positive saving. The component that balances the 
private sector’s budget constraint is the acquisition of foreign assets, which is not only coherent 
with the features of the scenario (removal of capital controls, high inflation, etc.) but also with 
the fact that since it is running a deficit, the rest of the world must be increasing its liabilities 
 
42 According to this approach, put forward by Fetherson and Godley (1978) and Godley and Cripps (1983), the 
private sector’s financial balance tends to be small, thereby inducing a mirror effect between the government deficit 
and the current account. 
43 The sudden reduction of the government surplus in the beginning of 2015 follows the increases in both current 
and capital expenditures, which are, in turn, sources of income for the private sector. Since these factors are not 
modified in the simulation, the effect applies both for the baseline and the scenario.  
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within the economy. This is how the balance sheets of the economy’s three sectors coherently 
balance each other out, thereby ensuring the accounting consistency of the model.       
 
Figure 12: External Vulnerability: New Keynesian Shock 
  
 
Regarding external vulnerability, figure 12 shows that while in the baseline there was a gradual 
deterioration that resulted from a combination of a leak of foreign exchange on the side of the 
current account (external flows fragility axis), mostly explained by the trade deficit, and a 
reduction of the central bank’s firepower due to the decrease of foreign reserves and the increase 
of short-term bills, in the scenario the situation is somewhat different. First, there was an 
increase in the current outflows in 2012 as the capital controls were relieved. Afterwards, the 
economy situates at higher levels of foreign exchange leakages as the private sector’s 
acquisition of foreign assets is larger than the current account surplus that this scenario brings 
about. As regards external debt, by the end of the simulation the economy finds itself around 41 
percent of GDP, which is almost double the level of the baseline but is still a low level in 
historical terms. In terms of room for maneuver, the firepower index is slightly lower (i.e., in a 
better shape) than in the baseline due to the fact that foreign reserves are not used to defend a 
certain parity. However, the central bank’s greater firepower that the larger stock of foreign 
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reserves implies is compensated for, though not entirely, by an increase in the private sector’s 
holding of short-term assets (central bank bills and money, which are the buffer of the private 
sector’s budget constraint). The result of this higher external financial fragility is that by the end 
of the simulation the size of the economy (represented by the size of the dots) is 12 percent 
smaller compared to the baseline.  
 
In sum, in the light of the model it seems that having applied an adjustment program around 
2012 along the lines of the New Keynesian model would have given the economy more external 
sustainability from the perspective of the current account balance (mainly through the reduction 
in imports that the recession would have brought about), but not necessarily if external financial 
flows are taken into account: first, because the lack of capital controls would have produced 
continuous outflows as a result of the private sector’s acquisition of foreign assets; and second, 
because the process of foreign indebtedness would have laid the foundations not only for 
interest payments but also for the feedback effect on the private sector’s acquisition of foreign 
assets. Besides the external vulnerabilities that this model would have produced, the negative 
impacts on the real side of the economy would have been strong, mainly on investment. The 
only aspect in which, according to the model, this program could have produced superior results 
compared to the baseline is on the fiscal front, where the reduction of public spending (on 
subsidies on utilities) would have more than compensated for the endogenous drop in taxes. 
Thus, such a program should only be considered if the government budget equilibrium or 
surplus is taken as the main (or sole) goal of macroeconomic policy.        
 
Question 2: The New Developmentalist Proposal 
The New Developmentalist proposal derived from the critique to the macroeconomic program 
pursued during the period 2012–15 implies the following policy changes: 
 
○ Setting the real exchange rate around a “competitive” rate, which is achieved through the 
sales and purchases of foreign reserves by the central bank (𝐹𝐴
2
endogenous) 
○ Not imposing any type of capital controls (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 2 0) 
○ Reducing the subsidies to the provision of utilities (𝑠 2 0.4) 
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○ Increasing the interest rate such that the real interest rate is slightly positive (𝑟 1
𝜋 1 𝑟 2 𝜋 2 0) 
○ Resuming financial integration through public foreign indebtedness, although at a lower 
intensity compared to the previous scenario (𝐸𝐷
2
1.05 𝐸𝐷 , )  
 
The establishment of a target real exchange rate at “competitive levels” can be observed in the 
bottom right panel of figure 13, where after an initial adjustment period it finally settles around 
the levels observed in the period 2004–8. As the top-left panel of figure 13 shows, in the 
beginning of the simulation the effect on GDP seems to be positive compared to the baseline, 
the main reason being the increase in net exports. The depreciation of the exchange rate induced 
by the removal of the capital controls reduces imports significantly, mostly through the real 
exchange rate channel. The higher exchange rate also boosts exports (ceteris paribus with 
Brazil’s growth), which are the main driver of the GDP growth observed until midway through 
2013. As inflation starts accelerating, the central bank induces an exchange rate depreciation 
such that the real exchange rate is kept constant. Consequently, private consumption drops as a 
result of the devaluation’s contractionary effects (which adds to the upward pressure that the 
reduction in subsidies has on prices). These dynamics are also strengthened by the endogenous 
behavior of private investment, which decreases in line with the drop in capacity utilization 
(middle-left panel of figure 13). In the medium run, the contractionary effects of this program 
seem to balance out with the expansionary ones, implying that a virtuous combination of 
policies could potentially exist, allowing the economy to grow at a decent rate without 
necessarily entailing a balance of payment disequilibrium.   
 
Compared to the previous scenario, the devaluation in real terms is larger, which implies that 
income distribution worsens to a larger extent (bottom-left panel of figure 13). The 
establishment of a target for the real exchange rate implies that the nominal exchange rate 
depreciates at a roughly constant rate (top-right panel of figure 13). The persistent depreciation 
of the exchange rate implies a permanent impulse to the dynamics of prices (which are also 
fueled by inertia) and the increase in the price of utilities (which results from the reduction of 
subsidies). The oscillatory dynamics of the inflation rate are mostly driven by the behavior of 
unit labor costs, which are in turn determined by the private wage. Given the bargaining power 
64 
 
of unions (which is quite high in Argentina), wages exhibit a high capacity to track the 
trajectory of prices. When the level of employment is high, as it happens in this scenario, the 
wages’ reaction to the movements in prices can be even stronger, which ends up feeding back 
into the price dynamics. According to these dynamics, the trajectory of prices produced in this 
scenario seems to be explained by the theory of inflation’s conflicting claims.    
 







A first look at the financial balances of the aggregate sectors (figure 14) shows that the 
evolution of private saving is very similar to the baseline, which implies that the changes in the 
current account should mirror the changes in the government’s financial balance (although the 
causality could go in either direction). The inversion of the trajectories of these financial 
balances are in line with the New Cambridge approach’s conclusions. The establishment of a 
target real exchange rate at a level that is higher relative to the baseline prevents the current 
account from turning negative. The better performance of the current account is not only 
explained by the increase in exports, but also by the endogenous reduction in imports that the 
recession brings about. Among the determinants of the drop in consumption is the removal of 
subsidies, which apart from improving the current account (through the lower imports that result 
from the decrease in the private sector’s purchasing power) contributes to the increase in the 
budget surplus. In the beginning of 2015, these dynamics were changed by the exogenous 
increase in the government’s current and capital transfers to the private sector,44 which further 
improve private savings while taking the fiscal balance into a deficit position. Although this 
behavior is partially reversed in the periods following 2015, it is not enough to restore the 
budget balance. As a result, the current account surplus is reduced, although it remains at a 
higher level compared to the baseline.  
 
As regards the implications of the financial balances on these sector’s balance sheets, the most 
salient result is that the combination of the government’s balanced budget with the soft increase 
in foreign indebtedness reduces the financing needs in domestic currency. Hence, the stock of 
bonds held by the private sector is reduced accordingly. The increasing wealth of the private 
sector is accumulated mostly under the form of foreign financial assets, central bank bills, and 
money, which act as the buffer that ensures the consistency between the stocks and flows of the 
private sector. As it was the case in the baseline, the increase in the stock of foreign assets—
which is in turn the liability of the rest of the world that increases to ensure the fulfillment of its 




44 Recall that these exogenous changes are not part of the policy program but the reproduction of fiscal behavior 
observed in 2015. When this exogenous increase in public spending is removed, the trajectories of the financial 
balances keep the dynamics registered until 2014. 
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Figure 14: Financial Balances: New Developmentalist Proposal 
  
 
In this second scenario the economy’s external vulnerability is lower, thereby suggesting that 
the underlying proposal might be more sustainable from the perspective of the balance of 
payments. The improvement in the current account balance induced by the real exchange rate 
depreciation is strengthened by a lower acquisition of foreign assets by the private sector, 
thereby reducing the external flow fragility indicator. The driver of the reduction in the demand 
for foreign assets is the decrease in exchange rate volatility. Thus, even if in this scenario capital 
controls are removed, the combination of external financing with the relative stabilization of the 
exchange rate seems to keep the acquisition of foreign assets below the previous scenario’s 
unstable levels. The central bank’s firepower is also increased as a result of the accumulation of 
foreign reserves enabled by the accumulation of current account surpluses in a context where 
the central bank targets a competitive value of the real exchange rate. This better performance in 
terms of external vulnerability prevents the economy from suffering the balance of payments 
crises that ultimately keep the economy stuck at (average) low growth rates. However, the better 
performance that the economy shows in terms of growth and balance of payments does not 
come without a cost, as the deterioration of the wage share shown in figure 13 illustrates. The 
trade-off between economic growth, income distribution, and external sustainability found in 
this scenario seems to be in line with the economic cycles that the Argentinean economy has 










Question 3: The New Keynesian Internal Critique 
Taking the critique that Sturzenegger (2019) makes to the New Keynesian program 
implemented in the period 2016–19, it is possible to create a scenario with the following 
features, which according to that theory would have produced better macroeconomic 
performance: 
 
○ A higher interest rate for the period 2016 and 2017, keeping it at a level around 40 
percent and thereby avoiding the actual reduction registered during those periods    
○ A stronger reduction of subsidies to utilities (𝑠 3 0.5𝑠 ) 
○ A reduction in the average allowance paid to the beneficiaries of the social security 
programs (𝐴𝐿 3 0.75𝐴𝐿 ) 







The effect of the combination of these policies on GDP is straightforward: there is a drastic 
reduction as a result of the slump in private consumption and investment. Several factors 
explain the drop in consumption. First, the reduction in the subsidies on utilities produces an 
increase in prices, which reduces households’ purchasing power. Second, the reduction of cash 
transfers also decreases disposable income. Third, the reduction in public employment further 
reduces the wage bill. The impact of the exchange rate on prices varies along the simulation 
according to the former’s behavior. In the beginning, after an initial devaluation triggered by the 
effect of the jump in prices on the demand for foreign assets, the nominal exchange rate seems 
to follow the trajectory of the baseline. A few periods after it appreciates as inflation (which has 
a direct impact on the demand for foreign assets and the consequent pressures on the exchange 
rate) and private wealth are reduced. Toward the end of the simulation it depreciates as inflation 
accelerates again.  
 
Inflation’s behavior is similar to that observed in the previous scenarios, even if the sample 
period is different: after an initial supply-side shock there is an increase in the private sector’s 
demand for foreign assets as a way of keeping its wealth safe from inflation. Since the central 
bank does not intervene, the exchange rate depreciates, thereby fueling the inflationary process. 
Eventually the nominal exchange rate stabilizes at a new (higher) level as private saving and, 
hence, the demand for foreign assets, decreases. Also, the reduction in the growth rate of 
nominal wages, mostly explained by the drop in employment, softens the inflationary pressures. 
However, by mid-2017, inflation accelerates again as employment stabilizes and wages start 
catching up to prices. The increase in the rate of inflation translates, once again, into a higher 
demand for foreign assets, which eventually ends up inducing an exchange rate depreciation.  
 
Regarding investment, its reduction obeys to the increase in the interest rate, the reduction in the 
rate of capacity utilization, and the decrease in the profit rate, these latter two being a direct 
consequence of the recession. Income distribution oscillates around the baseline, while the real 
wage, employment, and labor productivity fall along all the sample. The reason underlying this 
result (while income distribution could have been expected to worsen univocally) is that there 










The policy package implemented in this scenario entails a direct relationship between the 
financial balances of the private sector and the government. As a result of the restrictive fiscal 
policy that this program entails, the government deficit is significantly reduced, eventually 
reaching equilibrium and even becoming positive. Since the improvement in the government’s 
financial balance is mostly driven by the reduction in the transfers to the private sector (either 
through wages or direct transfers such as subsidies on utilities or social security benefits), the 
savings of the latter are reduced, though keeping (roughly) positive along almost all the sample. 
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An endogenous byproduct of this program is the improvement in the current account, which is a 
direct consequence of the drop in imports that the recession entails.45 The improvement in the 
government’s financial balance reduces its stock of domestic debt, which is in line with the 
reduction in the private sector’s saving in comparison to the baseline. The private sector also 
reduces its stock of bills (the devaluations discourage investment in this type of asset) and 
reallocates the composition of its portfolio in favor of foreign assets. It should be borne in mind 
that the private sector increasing its stock of foreign assets does not imply that it is net saving—
it only means that the rest of the world’s “budget constraint” is being fulfilled.46 What ensures 
the private sector’s flow-to-stock consistency is both the reduction in its holdings of domestic 
debt and money, this latter being the buffer variable.    
 
Figure 17: Financial Balances: New Keynesian Internal Critique) 
  
  
In terms of external vulnerability, from figure 18 it is possible to conclude that while the full-
fledged New Keynesian program would have not provided a safer scenario it would have been 
worse for the economy in terms of growth. Since the foreign indebtedness is assumed to be 
exogenous and kept unchanged in comparison to the baseline, the position of the economy on 
the corresponding axis is the same in both cases. A similar picture is observed for the case of the 
firepower index, that does not vary significantly, as the stock of foreign reserves is kept 
constant, while the sale of bills by the private sector is compensated for by an increase in the 
stock of money. The external flows’ fragility shows a very similar performance, although its 
 
45 Exports are lower compared to the baseline, as none of the exogenous variables that determine them are being 
shocked, and the real exchange rate appreciates as a result of the simulated program.   
46 Since the current account is improving and the fact that both foreign reserves and the private and public external 
liabilities are unchanged, it must be the case that the stock of foreign assets held by the private sector is increasing.  
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composition varies significantly relative to the baseline in the scenario, as there is a reduction in 
the acquisition of foreign assets (mainly in the first half of the sample) that is compensated for 
by the drop in exports that the real appreciation brings about. The decrease in imports 
contributes to softening the demand for foreign exchange but it is insufficient to provide higher 
sustainability to the balance of payments.  
 
Figure 18: External Vulnerability: New Keynesian Internal Critique 
  
 
Overall, in the case where a New Keynesian program without fiscal dominance had been 
implemented it seems that the economy’s external vulnerability would have been as high as it 
actually was, probably leading to the same events that ended up triggering the balance of 
payments crisis of 2018. But the effects on the real economy would have probably been worse, 
as the size of the dots in the right-hand panel of figure 18 show. The question of whether a full-
fledged New Keynesian program would have given markets more credibility in the Argentinean 
economy is still an open question. But if that had been the case, the result would have been a 
further increase in foreign indebtedness, which would have made the economy increase its 
external vulnerability (in terms of figure 18, a movement up and rightwards) eventually ending 
up in a crisis.  
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Question 4: The Heterodox Critique 
One of the main critiques of the program actually implemented in the period 2016–19 focuses 
on its underlying inflation theory. According to the government, inflation was mainly a problem 
of lack of credibility combined with an excessive monetary expansion. As long as tight 
monetary and fiscal policies were implemented, inflation would quickly go down to one-digit 
levels. According to the official viewpoint, restoring credibility not only implied the removal of 
certain regulations (like capital controls) but also reducing the budget deficit, the major part of 
which was created by the subsidies on utilities. On the contrary, from a heterodox perspective 
all these regulations had a specific goal: to prevent inflation from accelerating. Thus, simulating 
the effects of an alternative program that would have accounted for the fact that price dynamics 
are driven by supply-side factors implies the following assumptions:      
 
○ Capital controls are loosened, but not completely removed (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 4 0.5). 
○ The central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market to avoid large depreciations 
○ The interest rate is increased less than in the baseline (𝑟 4 0.9𝑟 )     
○ Subsidies on utilities are reduced to a lesser extent (𝑠 4 0.6) 
 
In order to analyze the results of the simulations it should be recalled that until 2015Q4 there 
were capital controls that put high constraints on the acquisition of foreign assets by the private 
sector. While in the baseline these controls are completely removed from 2016Q1 onwards, the 
scenario assumes that controls are softened but not entirely removed. Even if the reduction in 
capital controls increases the demand for foreign assets, thereby exerting upward pressure on the 
exchange rate, this is compensated for by a higher foreign exchange outflow coming from 
imports (which results from the higher level of activity, as is observed in the top-left panel of 
figure 19).47 As a consequence, the trajectory of the nominal exchange rate is similar to the 
baseline, also bringing about a similar behavior from inflation. The reason why the inflation rate 
is slightly lower than in the baseline is the softer reduction of the subsidies on utilities. The 
lower inflation implies that the private sector’s real disposable income is higher, thereby 
increasing consumption and investment (recall that investment depends on variables that are 
 
47 If the government wanted to prevent the exchange rate depreciation derived from the increase in imports, import 
tariffs and quotas could be established. The inclusion of these policy tools is left for a future version of the model. 
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directly related to economic activity, such as capacity utilization and the rate of profit). Overall, 
output exhibits more growth along all the simulation, although the endogenous devaluations that 
take place from time to time (in this case, from 2018Q2 onwards) eventually take it to a level 
that is roughly identical to the one observed in the beginning of the simulation.     
 
As in the previous scenarios inflation shows an oscillatory dynamic, the accelerations being 
explained by endogenous devaluations and the eventual supply-side shocks, and the 
decelerations happening when the nominal exchange rate temporarily stabilizes and wage 
pressures recede when employment levels decrease. Income distribution, for its part, tends to 
improve as the real wage increases, while labor productivity oscillates around the level observed 
in the baseline. Thus, the combination of policies entailed in this scenario yields a similar 
growth level to that found in the baseline but a more equitable income distribution, which is 
partly translated into a more appreciated real exchange rate. The problem of this outcome will 















Even if the alternative program examined in the simulation produces better performance in 
terms of production and demand, it does not seem sustainable from the perspective of the 
financial balances of the aggregate sectors. Figure 20 shows that the policies implemented in 
this scenario tend to deepen the disequilibria that were present until 2015, i.e., a current account 
deficit that, given the positive saving of the private sector, implied a large deficit for the 
government. Since the economic policies simulated in this scenario tend to reduce fiscal 
convergence (the subsidies on utilities are reduced at a slower pace than in the baseline), the 
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government deficit is larger. The higher level of activity combined with a more appreciated real 
exchange rate increases the current account deficit. Private saving stays at a positive level and 
increases slightly as a result of the increase in disposable income that results from the higher 
current transfers from the government (which take the form of subsidies on utilities). The 
external disequilibrium that the current account deficit implies is eventually cleared when a 
devaluation takes place (for instance, in the process that begins in 2018Q3). These sequences of 
current account deficits followed by devaluations, which were also present before the sample 
period of this simulation, illustrate this macroeconomic policy combination’s lack of 
sustainability. 
 
Figure 20: Financial Balances: Heterodox Critique 
  
 
Figure 21 shows that the heterodox program as proposed in this simulation would not have 
produced a better performance in terms of external vulnerability. As in the previous scenario, 
the economy’s position on the external debt axis is almost the same because there are no 
changes in the assumptions regarding this exogenous variable (the difference is given by the 
change in the denominator, GDP, which is larger in the scenario). In terms of the external flows 
sustainability index, the scenario exhibits worse performance, mostly explained by the lower 
current account balance, which more than compensates for the reduction in the acquisition of 
foreign assets by the private sector. In other words, the leak of foreign exchange that is 
prevented as a result of the establishment of capital controls (of intermediate intensity, as is the 
case of this scenario) seems to be self-defeating—preventing the exchange rate from 
depreciating as a result of the acquisition of foreign assets eventually results in a current account 
deficit, thereby putting pressure on the exchange rate. In order to dig deeper into the alternatives 
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at the government’s disposal, the model should be extended to include trade policy tools (such 
as imports quotas or tariffs) that can prevent the current account from worsening in a context 
where capital controls keep the exchange rate at levels that maintain private consumption at 
high levels.     
 




In conclusion, this last policy program, where inflation is tackled through a series of policy tools 
that account for its supply-side determinants, seems to produce better performance in terms of 
economic growth and income distribution. However, the question on the external sustainability 
of this alternative is still open. Further developments in the model developed in this paper could 
provide deeper insights into the possibility of attaining a stable and sustainable configuration of 







The word that best describes the economic dynamics of Argentina in the 2010s is stagflation. By 
the end of 2019, GDP was lower than it was ten years before, while the rate of inflation had 
more than doubled. Underneath this poor performance was a persistent balance of payments 
crisis, which came to the surface through the current account or the financial account, depending 
on what the French Regulation School calls the “mode of regulation.” Eventually, these tensions 
ended up triggering an exchange rate devaluation, thereby accelerating inflation and hampering 
the economy’s growth prospects.  
 
During this decade of stagflation, two governments with antagonistic political orientations were 
in power. Until 2015 there was a center-left administration that attempted to implement a set of 
policies associated with what is known as a wage-led growth regime. In December 2015, a 
center-right government took office and quickly implemented a set of market-friendly policies 
supposedly oriented to boosting growth through the increase in exports and (foreign) 
investment. Although the center-left government was able to keep GDP at a high level and 
managed to minimize crisis episodes, the path the economy was following did not seem to be 
sustainable, as the current account was persistently negative, the budget deficit was high, the 
inflation rate was well-above international standards, and there were a series of parallel (some of 
them illegal) exchange rate markets. On the other hand, the experience of the center-right 
government of the period 2016–19 ended in failure, even in the words of their most loyal 
advocates. In three of the four years of its administration, GDP dropped and the anti-inflation 
policies that were implemented ended up producing the results that were opposite of what the 
policymakers were expecting. The increase of foreign indebtedness beyond the financing needs 
of the economy, combined with the full liberalization of the financial account, brought about a 
crisis that coexisted with almost the whole second half of the administration.  
 
During each of these administrations there were critiques from the other side, which claimed 
that the path that was being taken was not sustainable and would eventually end up in a crisis. 
With the advantage of hindsight this paper addresses some of these critiques to examine to what 
extent the economic performance would have been better had the policy recommendations in 
those critiques been implemented. The analysis is made through an empirical SFC model in 
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order to ensure the coherence of the results and to give the outcomes of the simulations a 
holistic and dynamically consistent interpretation. Since to the author’s knowledge this model is 
the first of its kind for Argentina, most of the paper consists of the description of the model. The 
model was used to address four questions, two of them regarding the 2012–15 period and the 
other two focused on the 2016–19 interval. In the four cases the questions attempt to propose 
alternative policy combinations to the ones that were actually implemented. 
 
The alternatives to the wage-led model implemented in 2012–15 consist of a pure mainstream 
program, which was denoted as the New Keynesian alternative, and a hybrid proposal more in 
line with what is currently known as New Developmentalism. Compared to the baseline (the 
program that was actually implemented) both cases imply the establishment of more market-
friendly policies, although to a different extent (for instance, in the New Keynesian program the 
fiscal and monetary tightening is stronger). Only in the New Developmentalist case is it possible 
to conclude that the policy combination entailed in the macroeconomic program would have 
yielded better growth performance without jeopardizing the economy’s external sustainability. 
However, the byproduct of this better performance is a deterioration of income distribution. The 
New Keynesian program, for its part, has negative effects on GDP as a direct consequence of 
the fiscal adjustment and its effects on aggregate demand (through the channel of cost-push 
inflation and its impact on real private consumption). Although the current account exhibits 
better performance than in the baseline, this does not prevent the economy from the tensions in 
the balance of payments, as the liberalization of capital flows combined with the higher inflation 
rates end up increasing the acquisition of foreign assets. The increase in exports that a higher 
real exchange rate would yield does not seem to be strong enough to counter the contractionary 
effects of the devaluation, at least in the short and medium term and given the structure of the 
economy (as reflected in the parameters of the model) and the external conditions (as reflected 
in the exogenous variables beyond the control of the government).              
 
One of the alternatives to the New Keynesian approach implemented in 2016–19 is based on an 
internal critique, which states that the reason why the program failed is that it was fiscally 
dominated. Thus, in the third simulation a tout court New Keynesian program was tested. The 
results in terms of growth proved to be even poorer than the ones observed in the baseline, as 
the effect on inflation ends up being even worse. In terms of external vulnerability, the results of 
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this purer alternative do not seem to be better, as the better performance of the current account 
seems to be outweighed by the increase in the acquisition of foreign assets by the private sector. 
The last simulation, which was denoted as the heterodox critique, attempts to simulate the 
hypothetical effects of an anti-inflation program more focused on the supply-side determinants 
of inflation. In practice, this would have implied a softer fiscal tightening (because the reduction 
in the subsidies on utilities would have been lower) and a more intermediate flexibilization of 
capital controls. The results of the simulations show that such a program would have produced 
better results in terms of economic growth and inflation, but at the cost of keeping the 
disequilibria in the financial balances of the aggregate sectors at roughly the same levels 
observed in the period 2012–15, which did not seem sustainable.      
 
From the results of these first simulations that were made with the model presented in this paper 
a final hypothesis is made: that the problem that is keeping Argentina in stagflation goes beyond 
the domain of macroeconomics. The fact that in practice two antagonistic macroeconomic 
programs were implemented, neither of them being able to produce a good and sustainable 
macroeconomic performance, is a first symptom that favors the case for that hypothesis. When 
the model is used to counterfactually test the policy recommendations of these approaches with 
the external conditions that prevailed while the opposite program was implemented, none of 
them yield results that can be deemed sustainable. However, this need not imply that 
macroeconomic policy has nothing to contribute to a process of sustainable growth or that a 
coherent macroeconomic program is not a necessary condition for a process of structural change 
that tackles the deepest causes of the recurrent crises that affect the Argentinean economy. The 
model developed in this paper can be useful for studying the different policy combinations that, 
given a specific context, can bring about more stable and sustainable dynamics. If these were 
virtuously combined with the other dimensions of economic policy, it might be possible that 
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Estimation of Behavioral Equations 
All the behavioral equations, except for the portfolio equations, were estimated through standard 
error correction models. In all cases the following procedure was applied. First, augmented 
Dickey-Fuller unit root tests were made to verify the order of integration of the relevant 
variables. Once it was checked that the variables had the same order of integration, the Johansen 
cointegration test was applied. For the cases where cointegration relations were found, two 
models were estimated: one for the long term (where the variables were written in natural 
logarithms) and one for the short term (where the variables enter in their logarithmic differences 
of order one). After the estimations, the normality and homoscedasticity of the residuals were 
checked. In the case of portfolio equations, the estimations showed better results when using 
nonlinear autoregressive distributed lags models (NARDL), as proposed by Shin, Yu, and 
Greenwood-Nimmo (2014). In these cases, after running the estimations, asymmetric 
cointegration tests and asymmetry tests were done through the Wald test. An alternative version 
of the model was estimated through three stage least squares to account for potential 
simultaneity in some of the endogenous variables of the model. The use of this method did not 
significantly improve the results of the estimations.  
 















































Table A2: Model Variables  
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